Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral: now theIntellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, fromteaching (for the most part that is), and needs therefore experienceand time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek termdenoting it is but a slight deflection from the term denoting custom inthat language.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to bein us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, nonecan be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitatingdownwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if onewere to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; norcould file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whosenature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtuesthen come to be in us neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, butwe are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving themu and areperfected in them through custom.
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the facultiesfirst and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration ofwhich is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was notfrom having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but justthe reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not havethem because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by firstperforming single acts of working, which, again, is the case of otherthings, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when wehave learned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to bebuilders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on theharp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing theactions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and bydoing brave actions brave.
And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place incommunities: because the law-givers make the individual members good menby habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every law-giver,and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and hereinconsists the difference between a good Constitution and a bad.
Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the verysame circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by playingthe harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed: andsimilarly builders and all the rest; by building well men will becomegood builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this had not beenso, there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would havebeen at once good or bad in their several arts without them.
So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the variousrelations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be,some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and beinghabituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, otherscowards.
Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger:for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, othersdestitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behavingin one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in oneword, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them: andso what we have to do is to give a certain character to these particularacts, because the habits formed correspond to the differences of these.
So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight fromchildhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather Iwould say it makes all the difference.
II
Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation,as it is of some others (for we are inquiring not merely that we mayknow what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would havebeen useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we areto do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habitsthat shall be formed depends on these.
Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a generalmaxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of ithereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its relationsto the other virtues.
[Sidenote: 1104a]
But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that allwhich can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were,and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoningonly must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, andmatters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more thanmatters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is such,still less in its application to particular cases is exactnessattainable: because these fall not under any art or system of rules, butit must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look to theexigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of healing,or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present subject isconfessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.
First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things tobe spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health andstrength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen wemust use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength aswell as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or toosmall quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they cause,increase, and preserve it.
Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery andCourage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from andfears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be acoward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to berash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstainsfrom none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, asdo the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties ofperception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery andCourage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state arepreserved.
Furthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of thehabits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts ofworking after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: forso it is also with those other things which are more directly matters ofsight, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of foodand doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is bestable to do these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do we byabstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in Self-Mastery, but whenwe have come to be so we can best abstain from them: similarly too withCourage: for it is by accustoming ourselves to despise objects of fearand stand up against them that we come to be brave; and [Sidenote(?):1104b] after we have come to be so we shall be best able to stand upagainst such objects.
And for a test of the formation of the habits we must [Sidenote(?): III]take the pleasure or pain which succeeds the acts; for he is perfectedin Self-Mastery who not only abstains from the bodily pleasures but isglad to do so; whereas he who abstains but is sorry to do it has notSelf-Mastery: he again is brave who stands up against danger, eitherwith positive pleasure or at least without any pain; whereas he who doesit with pain is not brave.
For Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, becauseby reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain declinedoing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should havebeen trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and painfrom proper objects, for this is the right education). Again: sinceVirtues have to do with actions and feelings, and on every feeling andevery action pleasure and pain follow, here again is another proof thatVirtue has for its object-matter pleasure and pain. The same isshown also by the fact that punishments are effected through theinstrumentality of these; because they are of the nature of remedies,and it is the nature of remedies to be the contraries of the ills theycure. Again, to quote what we said before: every habit of the Soul byits very nature has relation to, and exerts itself upon, things of thesame kind as those by which it is naturally deteriorated or improved:now such habits do come to be vicious by reason of pleasures and pains,that is, by men pursuing or avoiding respectively, either such as theyought not, or at wrong times, or in wrong manner, and so forth (forwhich reason, by the way, some people define the Virtues as certainstates of impassibility and utter quietude, but they are wrong becausethey speak without modification, instead of adding "as they ought," "asthey ought not," and "when," and so on). Virtue then is assumed to bethat habit which is such, in relation to pleasures and pains, as toeffect the best results, and Vice the contrary.
The following considerations may also serve to set this in a clearlight. There are principally three things moving us to choice and threeto avoidance, the honourable, the expedient, the pleasant; and theirthree contraries, the dishonourable, the hurtful, and the painful: nowthe good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respectto all these of course, but most specially with respect to pleasure:because not only is this common to him with all animals but also it isa concomitant of all those things which move to choice, since both thehonourable and the expedient give an impression of pleasure.
[Sidenote: 1105a] Again, it grows up with us all from infancy, and so itis a hard matter to remove from ourselves this feeling, engrained as itis into our very life.
Again, we adopt pleasure and pain (some of us more, and some less) asthe measure even of actions: for this cause then our whole business mustbe with them, since to receive right or wrong impressions of pleasureand pain is a thing of no little importance in respect of the actions.Once more; it is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against pleasurethan against anger: now it is about that which is more than commonlydifficult that art comes into being, and virtue too, because in thatwhich is difficult the good is of a higher order: and so for thisreason too both virtue and moral philosophy generally must wholly busythemselves respecting pleasures and pains, because he that uses thesewell will be good, he that does so ill will be bad.
Let us then be understood to have stated, that Virtue has for itsobject-matter pleasures and pains, and that it is either increased ormarred by the same circumstances (differently used) by which itis originally generated, and that it exerts itself on the samecircumstances out of which it was generated.
Now I can conceive a person perplexed as to the meaning of ourstatement, that men must do just actions to become just, and those ofself-mastery to acquire the habit of self-mastery; "for," he would say,"if men are doing the actions they have the respective virtues already,just as men are grammarians or musicians when they do the actions ofeither art." May we not reply by saying that it is not so even in thecase of the arts referred to: because a man may produce somethinggrammatical either by chance or the suggestion of another; but then onlywill he be a grammarian when he not only produces something grammaticalbut does so grammarian-wise, i.e. in virtue of the grammaticalknowledge he himself possesses.
Again, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: becausethose things which are produced by the arts have their excellence inthemselves, and it is sufficient therefore [Sidenote: 1105b] that thesewhen produced should be in a certain state: but those which are producedin the way of the virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certainkind (say of Justice or perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if inthemselves they are in a certain state but if also he who does themdoes them being himself in a certain state, first if knowing what he isdoing, next if with deliberate preference, and with such preference forthe things' own sake; and thirdly if being himself stable and unapt tochange. Now to constitute possession of the arts these requisites arenot reckoned in, excepting the one point of knowledge: whereas forpossession of the virtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but theother requisites avail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, andthese requisites as a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing theactions of Justice and perfected Self-Mastery.
The facts, it is true, are called by the names of these habits when theyare such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but he isnot in possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but he whoalso so does them as the just and self-mastering do them.
We are right then in saying, that these virtues are formed in a man byhis doing the actions; but no one, if he should leave them undone, wouldbe even in the way to become a good man. Yet people in general do notperform these actions, but taking refuge in talk they flatter themselvesthey are philosophising, and that they will so be good men: acting intruth very like those sick people who listen to the doctor with greatattention but do nothing that he tells them: just as these then cannotbe well bodily under such a course of treatment, so neither can those bementally by such philosophising.
[Sidenote: V] Next, we must examine what Virtue is. Well, since thethings which come to be in the mind are, in all, of three kinds,Feelings, Capacities, States, Virtue of course must belong to one of thethree classes.
By Feelings, I mean such as lust, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy,friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, compassion, in short all such asare followed by pleasure or pain: by Capacities, those in right of whichwe are said to be capable of these feelings; as by virtue of which weare able to have been made angry, or grieved, or to have compassionated;by States, those in right of which we are in a certain relation goodor bad to the aforementioned feelings; to having been made angry, forinstance, we are in a wrong relation if in our anger we were too violentor too slack, but if we were in the happy medium we are in a rightrelation to the feeling. And so on of the rest.
Now Feelings neither the virtues nor vices are, because in right of theFeelings we are not denominated either good or bad, but in right of thevirtues and vices we are.
[Sidenote: 1106a] Again, in right of the Feelings we are neitherpraised nor blamed (for a man is not commended for being afraid orbeing angry, nor blamed for being angry merely but for being so in aparticular way), but in right of the virtues and vices we are.
Again, both anger and fear we feel without moral choice, whereas thevirtues are acts of moral choice, or at least certainly not independentof it.
Moreover, in right of the Feelings we are said to be moved, but in rightof the virtues and vices not to be moved, but disposed, in a certainway.
And for these same reasons they are not Capacities, for we are notcalled good or bad merely because we are able to feel, nor are wepraised or blamed.
And again, Capacities we have by nature, but we do not come to be goodor bad by nature, as we have said before.
Since then the virtues are neither Feelings nor Capacities, it remainsthat they must be States.
[Sidenote: VI] Now what the genus of Virtue is has been said; but wemust not merely speak of it thus, that it is a state but say also whatkind of a state it is. We must observe then that all excellence makesthat whereof it is the excellence both to be itself in a good state andto perform its work well. The excellence of the eye, for instance, makesboth the eye good and its work also: for by the excellence of the eyewe see well. So too the excellence of the horse makes a horse good, andgood in speed, and in carrying his rider, and standing up against theenemy. If then this is universally the case, the excellence of Man, i.e.Virtue, must be a state whereby Man comes to be good and whereby he willperform well his proper work. Now how this shall be it is true we havesaid already, but still perhaps it may throw light on the subject to seewhat is its characteristic nature.
In all quantity then, whether continuous or discrete, one may take thegreater part, the less, or the exactly equal, and these either withreference to the thing itself, or relatively to us: and the exactlyequal is a mean between excess and defect. Now by the mean of the thing,i.e. absolute mean, I denote that which is equidistant from eitherextreme (which of course is one and the same to all), and by the meanrelatively to ourselves, that which is neither too much nor too littlefor the particular individual. This of course is not one nor the same toall: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two too little, peopletake six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the smaller sum byexactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this mean isaccording to arithmetical proportion.
[Sidenote: 1106b] But the mean relatively to ourselves must not beso found ; for it does not follow, supposing ten min?is too large aquantity to eat and two too small, that the trainer will order his mansix; because for the person who is to take it this also may be too muchor too little: for Milo it would be too little, but for a man justcommencing his athletic exercises too much: similarly too of theexercises themselves, as running or wrestling.
So then it seems every one possessed of skill avoids excess and defect,but seeks for and chooses the mean, not the absolute but the relative.
Now if all skill thus accomplishes well its work by keeping an eye onthe mean, and bringing the works to this point (whence it is commonenough to say of such works as are in a good state, "one cannot addto or take ought from them," under the notion of excess or defectdestroying goodness but the mean state preserving it), and goodartisans, as we say, work with their eye on this, and excellence, likenature, is more exact and better than any art in the world, it must havean aptitude to aim at the mean.
It is moral excellence, i.e. Virtue, of course which I mean, becausethis it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in thesethere can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, forinstance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger,compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little,and in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on whatoccasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or inother words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue.
In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess anddefect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions,in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean ispraised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue.Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has anaptitude for aiming at the mean.
Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as thePythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, goodof the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, thelatter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and forthese reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice, andthe mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,
"Men may be bad in many ways, But good in one alone."
Virtue then is "a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in therelative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdomwould determine."
It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess onone side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because thefaulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed,what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; butVirtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is amean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it isthe highest state possible.
But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling iscapable of subsisting in this mean state, because some there arewhich are so named as immediately to convey the notion of badness, asmalevolence, shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery,theft, homicide; for all these and suchlike are blamed because they arein themselves bad, not the having too much or too little of them.
In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor insuch does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper person,time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing any onesoever of those things is being wrong.
You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state,an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly, orgiving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will beof excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect,defect.
But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess anddefect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest possiblestate, so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean state,excess, or defect, but howsoever done they are wrong: you cannot, inshort, have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean stateexcess and defect.
VII
It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must alsoapply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conductgeneral statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go intodetail one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be indetail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold goodhere.
We must take these details then from the Table.
I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness:
[Sidenote: 1107b]
The Mean state is Courage: men may exceed, of course, either in absenceof fear or in positive confidence: the former has no name (which is acommon case), the latter is called rash: again, the man who has too muchfear and too little confidence is called a coward.
II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewerpains than pleasures):
The Mean state here is perfected Self-Mastery, the defect total absenceof Self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, there are reallyno people who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really noname for such characters, but, as they are conceivable, we will givethem one and call them insensible.
III. In respect of giving and taking wealth (a):
The mean state is Liberality, the excess Prodigality, the defectStinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess anddefect contrary to each other: I mean, the prodigal gives out too muchand takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much andgives out too little. (It must be understood that we are now givingmerely an outline and summary, intentionally: and we will, in a laterpart of the treatise, draw out the distinctions with greater exactness.)
IV. In respect of wealth (b):
There are other dispositions besides these just mentioned; a mean statecalled Munificence (for the munificent man differs from the liberal, theformer having necessarily to do with great wealth, the latter with butsmall); the excess called by the names either of Want of taste orVulgar Profusion, and the defect Paltriness (these also differ from theextremes connected with liberality, and the manner of their differenceshall also be spoken of later).
V. In respect of honour and dishonour (a):
The mean state Greatness of Soul, the excess which may be calledbraggadocio, and the defect Littleness of Soul.
VI. In respect of honour and dishonour (b):
[Sidenote: 1108a]
Now there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul aswe said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the differencethat is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this statehaving reference to small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour;a man may, of course, grasp at honour either more than he should orless; now he that exceeds in his grasping at it is called ambitious, hethat falls short unambitious, he that is just as he should be has noproper name: nor in fact have the states, except that the disposition ofthe ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are ineither extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we callthe virtuous character sometimes by the name ambitious, sometimes bythat of unambitious, and we commend sometimes the one and sometimesthe other. Why we do it shall be said in the subsequent part of thetreatise; but now we will go on with the rest of the virtues after theplan we have laid down.
VII. In respect of anger:
Here too there is excess, defect, and a mean state; but since theymay be said to have really no proper names, as we call the virtuouscharacter Meek, we will call the mean state Meekness, and of theextremes, let the man who is excessive be denominated Passionate, andthe faulty state Passionateness, and him who is deficient Angerless, andthe defect Angerlessness.
There are also three other mean states, having some mutual resemblance,but still with differences; they are alike in that they all have fortheir object-matter intercourse of words and deeds, and they differ inthat one has respect to truth herein, the other two to what is pleasant;and this in two ways, the one in relaxation and amusement, the other inall things which occur in daily life. We must say a word or two aboutthese also, that we may the better see that in all matters the mean ispraiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor worthy of praisebut of blame.
Now of these, it is true, the majority have really no proper names, butstill we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for thesake of clearness and intelligibleness.
I. In respect of truth: The man who is in the mean state we will callTruthful, and his state Truthfulness, and as to the disguise of truth,if it be on the side of exaggeration, Braggadocia, and him that has it aBraggadocio; if on that of diminution, Reserve and Reserved shall be theterms.
II. In respect of what is pleasant in the way of relaxation oramusement: The mean state shall be called Easy-pleasantry, and thecharacter accordingly a man of Easy-pleasantry; the excess Buffoonery,and the man a Buffoon; the man deficient herein a Clown, and his stateClownishness.
III. In respect of what is pleasant in daily life: He that is as heshould be may be called Friendly, and his mean state Friendliness: hethat exceeds, if it be without any interested motive, somewhat tooComplaisant, if with such motive, a Flatterer: he that is deficient andin all instances unpleasant, Quarrelsome and Cross.
There are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them.Shamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised forbeing shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in themean state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for instance,who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the man who isin the defect, i.e. who has no shame at all in his composition, iscalled Shameless: but the right character Shamefaced.
Indignation against successful vice, again, is a state in the meanbetween Envy and Malevolence: they all three have respect to pleasureand pain produced by what happens to one's neighbour: for the man whohas this right feeling is annoyed at undeserved success of others, whilethe envious man goes beyond him and is annoyed at all success of others,and the malevolent falls so far short of feeling annoyance that he evenrejoices [at misfortune of others].
But for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity,as of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. Soafter this we will go accurately into each and say how they are meanstates: and in like manner also with respect to the IntellectualExcellences.
Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the wayof excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of courseall are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for instance, notonly to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to the extremes:for just as the half is greater if compared with the less portion, andless if compared with the greater, so the mean states, compared with thedefects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and vice versa. Thebrave man, for instance, shows as rash when compared with the coward,and cowardly when compared with the rash; similarly too the man ofperfected self-mastery, viewed in comparison with the man destitute ofall perception, shows like a man of no self-control, but in comparisonwith the man who really has no self-control, he looks like one destituteof all perception: and the liberal man compared with the stingy seemsprodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.
And so the extreme characters push away, so to speak, towards each otherthe man in the mean state; the brave man is called a rash man bythe coward, and a coward by the rash man, and in the other casesaccordingly. And there being this mutual opposition, the contrarietybetween the extremes is greater than between either and the mean,because they are further from one another than from the mean, just asthe greater or less portion differ more from each other than either fromthe exact half.
Again, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean;rashness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality; butbetween the extremes there is the greatest dissimilarity. Now thingswhich are furthest from one another are defined to be contrary, and sothe further off the more contrary will they be.
[Sidenote: 1109a] Further: of the extremes in some cases the excess,and in others the defect, is most opposed to the mean: to courage, forinstance, not rashness which is the excess, but cowardice which is thedefect; whereas to perfected self-mastery not insensibility which is thedefect but absence of all self-control which is the excess.
And for this there are two reasons to be given; one from the nature ofthe thing itself, because from the one extreme being nearer and morelike the mean, we do not put this against it, but the other; as, forinstance, since rashness is thought to be nearer to courage thancowardice is, and to resemble it more, we put cowardice against couragerather than rashness, because those things which are further from themean are thought to be more contrary to it. This then is one reasonarising from the thing itself; there is another arising from our ownconstitution and make: for in each man's own case those things give theimpression of being more contrary to the mean to which we individuallyhave a natural bias. Thus we have a natural bias towards pleasures,for which reason we are much more inclined to the rejection of allself-control, than to self-discipline.
These things then to which the bias is, we call more contrary, and sototal want of self-control (the excess) is more contrary than the defectis to perfected self-mastery.
IX
Now that Moral Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so, and that itlies between two faulty states, one in the way of excess and another inthe way of defect, and that it is so because it has an aptitude to aimat the mean both in feelings and actions, all this has been set forthfully and sufficiently.
And so it is hard to be good: for surely hard it is in each instance tofind the mean, just as to find the mean point or centre of a circle isnot what any man can do, but only he who knows how: just so to be angry,to give money, and be expensive, is what any man can do, and easy: butto do these to the right person, in due proportion, at the right time,with a right object, and in the right manner, this is not as before whatany man can do, nor is it easy; and for this cause goodness is rare, andpraiseworthy, and noble.
Therefore he who aims at the mean should make it his first care to keepaway from that extreme which is more contrary than the other to themean; just as Calypso in Homer advises Ulysses,
"Clear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;"
because of the two extremes the one is always more, and the otherless, erroneous; and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean isdifficult, one must take the least of the evils as the safest plan; andthis a man will be doing, if he follows this method.
[Sidenote: 1109b] We ought also to take into consideration our ownnatural bias; which varies in each man's case, and will be ascertainedfrom the pleasure and pain arising in us. Furthermore, we should forceourselves off in the contrary direction, because we shall find ourselvesin the mean after we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side,exactly as men do in straightening bent timber.
But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant,and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it.
We ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellorstowards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence; for so bysending it away from us, we shall err the less.
Well, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting whichwe shall be best able to attain the mean.
Still, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and speciallyin the particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determineexactly in what manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for whatlength of time, one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves sometimespraise those who are defective in this feeling, and we call them meek;at another, we term the hot-tempered manly and spirited.
Then, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be iton the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makesa considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what pointor degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy todetermine exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which arematter of perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters ofdetail, and the decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.
At all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all thingspraiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towardsexcess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest methodof hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.