[Sidenote:1129a] Now the points for our inquiry in respect of Justiceand Injustice are, what kind of actions are their object-matter, andwhat kind of a mean state Justice is, and between what points theabstract principle of it, i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our inquiryshall be, if you please, conducted in the same method as we haveobserved in the foregoing parts of this treatise.
We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state suchthat in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what isjust, and actually do it, and wish it: similarly also with respect toInjustice, a moral state such that in consequence of it men do unjustlyand wish what is unjust: let us also be content then with these as aground-work sketched out.
I mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to Stateswhether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I meanthat whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embracescontraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not thecontrary acts are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walkshealthily when he walks as the healthy man would.
However, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known fromthe other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if it beseen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen what abad state is, and from the things which belong to a good state of bodythe good state itself is seen, and vice versa. If, for instance,the good state is firmness of flesh it follows that the bad state isflabbiness of flesh; and whatever causes firmness of flesh is connectedwith the good state. It follows moreover in general, that if of twocontrary terms the one is used in many senses so also will the other be;as, for instance, if "the Just," then also "the Unjust." Now Justice andInjustice do seem to be used respectively in many senses, but, becausethe line of demarcation between these is very fine and minute, itcommonly escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plainand manifest as where the various significations of terms are widelydifferent for in these last the visible difference is great, forinstance, the word [Greek: klehis] is used equivocally to denote thebone which is under the neck of animals and the instrument with whichpeople close doors.
Let it be ascertained then in how many senses the term "Unjust man" isused. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, andthe unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the Justman will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man "TheJust" then will be the lawful and the equal, and "the Unjust" theunlawful and the unequal.
[Sidenote:1129b] Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, hewill be so, of course, with respect to good things, but not of everykind, only those which are the subject-matter of good and bad fortuneand which are in themselves always good but not always to theindividual. Yet men pray for and pursue these things: this they shouldnot do but pray that things which are in the abstract good may be soalso to them, and choose what is good for themselves.
But the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part, buteven sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply evil:still, since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good and thegrasping is after good, therefore even in this case he is thought to bea grasping man, i.e. one who strives for more good than fairly falls tohis share: of course he is also an unequal man, this being an inclusiveand common term.
We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the LawJust: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a mannerJust, because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by thelegislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too givedirections on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, orthat of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standardreal goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean byJust, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness andits ingredients for the social community.
Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man(as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one's arms),but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence fromadultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining fromstriking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in respectof the other virtues and vices commanding some things and forbiddingothers, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat inferior if it isone extemporised.
Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but asexercised towards one's neighbour: and for this reason Justice isthought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and
"neither Hesper nor the Morning-star So worthy of our admiration:"
and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
"All virtue is in Justice comprehended."
And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practiceof perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able topractise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; Imean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of theirown personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions with[Sidenote:1130a] their neighbour. And for this reason that saying ofBias is thought to be a good one,
"Rule will show what a man is;"
for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in acommunity. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues isthought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation tosome other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous toanother, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basestof men who practises vice not only in his own person but towards hisfriends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in hisown person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of somedifficulty.
However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but isco-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it apart of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in thissense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is thesame really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it hasrespect to one's neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such andsuch a moral state it is simply Virtue.
II
But the object of our inquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it isa part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), andlikewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence ofthis last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vicesby practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not graspat more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of cowardicehe throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses abusivelanguage, or by reason of stinginess does not give a friend pecuniaryassistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is often in theway of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them, still inthe way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in the way ofInjustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from thatco-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and some"Unjust" related to that which is co-extensive with violation of the lawas a part to a whole.
Again, suppose one man seduces a man's wife with a view to gain andactually gets some advantage by it, and another does the same fromimpulse of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will bethought to be rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, andthe former Unjust but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainlybecause of his gaining.
Again, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particulardepravity, as, if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to hispassions; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikesanother, to anger: but if he gains by the act to no other vice than toInjustice.
[Sidenote:1131b] Thus it is clear that there is a kind of Injusticedifferent from and besides that which includes all Vice, having the samename because the definition is in the same genus; for both have theirforce in dealings with others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth,or safety, or by whatever one name we can include all these things, andis actuated by pleasure attendant on gain, while the other acts upon allthings which constitute the sphere of the good man's action.
Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is onewhich is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with,Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are itscharacteristics.
Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal, andthe Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the aforementionedInjustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the unequal and the moreare not the same, but differing as part to whole (because all more isunequal, but not all unequal more), so the Unjust and the Injustice weare now in search of are not the same with, but other than, those beforementioned, the one being the parts, the other the wholes; for thisparticular Injustice is a part of the Injustice co-extensive with Vice,and likewise this Justice of the Justice co-extensive with Virtue.So that what we have now to speak of is the particular Justice andInjustice, and likewise the particular Just and Unjust.
Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justiceranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in allits bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice (beingsimilarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must separateoff the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may prettywell say that most lawful things are those which naturally result inaction from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law enjoins theliving in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in accordancewith each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all its bearingsare those enactments which have been made respecting education forsociety.
By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man issimply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of[Greek: politikhae] or some other science we must determine at afuture time: for it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man anda good citizen in every case.
Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one speciesis that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth, orsuch other things as are to be shared among the members of the socialcommunity (because in these one man as compared with another may haveeither an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which isCorrective in the various transactions between man and man.
[Sidenote: 1131a] And of this latter there are two parts: because oftransactions some are voluntary and some involuntary; voluntary, such asfollow; selling, buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, hiring: and thisclass is called voluntary because the origination of these transactionsis voluntary.
The involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft,adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination, falsewitness; or accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds, death,plundering, maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.
III
Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract "Unjust"unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal,that is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever actionthere is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. theexact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which allmust allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Justmust be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: itfollows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these tocertain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things(that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal, betweentwo, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons. The Justthen must imply four terms at least, for those to which it is just aretwo, and the terms representing the things are two.
And there will be the same equality between the terms representing thepersons, as between those representing the things: because as the latterare to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not equalthey must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source of allthe quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who areequal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not equalthose things which are equal. Again, the necessity of this equality ofratios is shown by the common phrase "according to rate," for all agreethat the Just in distributions ought to be according to some rate:but what that rate is to be, all do not agree; the democrats are forfreedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth, and thearistocratic party for virtue.
The Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion doesnot apply merely to number in the abstract, but to number generally,since it is equality of ratios, and implies four terms at least (thatthis is the case in what may be called discrete proportion is plain andobvious, but it is true also in continual proportion, for this uses theone [Sidenote: 1131b] term as two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C maybe expressed A:B::B:C. In the first, B is named twice; and so, if, asin the second, B is actually written twice, the proportionals will befour): and the Just likewise implies four terms at the least, and theratio between the two pair of terms is the same, because the persons andthe things are divided similarly. It will stand then thus, A:B::C:D, andthen permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and D to represent thethings) A C:B D::A:B. The distribution in fact consisting in puttingtogether these terms thus: and if they are put together so as topreserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together justly. Sothen the joining together of the first and third and second and fourthproportionals is the Just in the distribution, and this Just is themean relatively to that which violates the proportionate, forthe proportionate is a mean and the Just is proportionate. Nowmathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical: for ingeometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each part to eachpart. Furthermore this proportion is not continual, because the personand thing do not make up one term.
The Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violatesthe proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less:which in fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who actsunjustly has the greater share and he who is treated unjustly has theless of what is good: but in the case of what is bad this is reversed:for the less evil compared with the greater comes to be reckoned forgood, because the less evil is more choiceworthy than the greater, andwhat is choiceworthy is good, and the more so the greater good.
This then is the one species of the Just.
IV
And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary aswell as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different formfrom the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution ofcommon property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: Imean that, if the division is made out of common property, theshares will bear the same proportion to one another as the originalcontributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is thatwhich violates the proportionate.
But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in acertain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of thatproportion but of arithmetical. [Sidenote: 1132a ] Because it makes nodifference whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good manon a bad or by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man hascommitted adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by theinjury and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does andthe other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other sufferedharm. And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduceto equality again, because really when the one party has been woundedand the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, thesuffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the judgetries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the gain.
For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though perhapsthe term in some particular instance may not be strictly proper, asgain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and loss to him whohas received it: still, when the suffering has been estimated, the oneis called loss and the other gain.
And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, whichrepresent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of goodand the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil isloss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal wesay is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between lossand gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men haverecourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just,for the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just. And menseek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given bysome to judges ([Greek: mesidioi], or middle-men) under the notion thatif they can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is thensurely a mean since the judge is also.
So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as itwere, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part thatby which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And when thewhole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say they havetheir own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is a meanbetween the greater and the less according to arithmetical equality.
This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which wein Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; ([Greek: dikaion] quasi[Greek: dichaion], that is in two parts, and [Greek: dikastaes] quasi[Greek: dichastaes], he who divides into two parts). For when from oneof two equal magnitudes somewhat has been taken and added to the other,this latter exceeds the former by twice that portion: if it had beenmerely taken from the former and not added to the latter, then thelatter would [Sidenote:1132b] have exceeded the former only by that oneportion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean by one, andthe mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the portion wastaken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to determine whatone ought to take from him who has the greater, and what to add to himwho has the less. The excess of the mean over the less must be added tothe less, and the excess of the greater over the mean be taken from thegreater.
Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one ofthem cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The wholeline thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line, bytwice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by thatportion. And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntaryexchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one's own iscalled gaining, and the having less than one's original stock is calledlosing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactionswhich are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more norless, but exactly the same as there was originally, people say they havetheir own, and neither lose nor gain.
So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss andgain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having thesame after the transaction as one had before it took place.
[Sidenote: V] There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation issimply just, as the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simplyand without qualification as "That which reciprocates with another." Butthis simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the DistributiveJust, or the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they puton the Rhadamanthian rule of Just, If a man should suffer what he hathdone, then there would be straightforward justice"), for in manycases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in authorityhas struck a man, he is not to be struck in turn; or if a man hasstruck one in authority, he must not only be struck but punished also.And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions makes agreat difference.
[Sidenote: II33a] But in dealings of exchange such a principle ofJustice as this Reciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it mustbe Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, becauseby proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is heldtogether, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this benot allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or elseReciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is noadmission to participation which is the very bond of their union.
And this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces ([Greek:charites]) in the public streets; to impress the notion that there maybe requital, this being peculiar to [Greek: charis] because a man oughtto requite with a good turn the man who has done him a favour and thento become himself the originator of another [Greek: charis], by doinghim a favour.
Now the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be representedby the diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which theparties and their wares are so placed that the side connecting theparties be opposite to that connecting the wares, and each party beconnected by one side with his own ware, as in the accompanying diagram.
The builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to givehim of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, andthen the Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just resultwhich we are speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will theconnection stand: for there is no reason why the ware of the one may notbe better than that of the other, and therefore before the exchange ismade they must have been equalised. And this is so also in the otherarts: for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not acorrespondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer andthe consumer. For, we must remember, no dealing arises between two ofthe same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a physicianand agriculturist, or, to state it generally, between those who aredifferent and not equal, but these of course must have been equalisedbefore the exchange can take place.
It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchangedshould be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has comein, and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and solikewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equalto a house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to theshoemaker, so many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of abuilder an agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there isthis proportion there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this proportioncannot be unless the terms are in some way equal; hence the need, as wasstated above, of some one measure of all things. Now this is reallyand truly the Demand for them, which is the common bond of all suchdealings. For if the parties were not in want at all or not similarly ofone another's wares, there would either not be any exchange, or at leastnot the same.
And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative ofDemand: and the account of its Greek name [Greek: nomisma] is this, thatit is what it is not naturally but by custom or law ([Greek: nomos]),and it rests with us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.
[Sidenote: 1113b] Very well then, there will be Reciprocation whenthe terms have been equalised so as to stand in this proportion;Agriculturist : Shoemaker : : wares of Shoemaker : wares ofAgriculturist; but you must bring them to this form of proportion whenthey exchange, otherwise the one extreme will combine both exceedings ofthe mean: but when they have exactly their own then they are equal andhave dealings, because the same equality can come to be in their case.Let A represent an agriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his waresequalised with A's. Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; nowReciprocation will be practicable, if it were not, there would have beenno dealing.
Now that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being someone thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not want theother or neither want one another, they do not exchange at all: whereasthey do when one wants what the other man has, wine for instance, givingin return corn for exportation.
And further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchangeat some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shallhave it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one bringsit one can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is liableto depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the same,but still it is of a more permanent nature than the commodities itrepresents. And this is the reason why all things should have a priceset upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time, and ifexchange then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all thingscommensurable equalises them: for if there was not exchange there wouldnot have been dealing, nor exchange if there were not equality, norequality if there were not the capacity of being commensurate: itis impossible that things so greatly different should be reallycommensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all practicalpurposes in reference to Demand. The common measure must be some onething, and also from agreement (for which reason it is called [Greek:nomisma]), for this makes all things commensurable: in fact, all thingsare measured by money. Let B represent ten min? A a house worth fivemin? or in other words half B, C a bed worth 1/10th of B: it is clearthen how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.
It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the existenceof money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a house fivebeds or the price of five beds. We have now said then what the abstractJust and Unjust are, and these having been defined it is plain thatjust acting is a mean between acting unjustly and being acted unjustlytowards: the former being equivalent to having more, and the latter tohaving less.
But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the samemanner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producingthe mean, while Injustice occupies both the extremes.
[Sidenote: 1134a] And Justice is the moral state in virtue of whichthe just man is said to have the aptitude for practising the Just inthe way of moral choice, and for making division between , himself andanother, or between two other men, not so as to give to himself thegreater and to his neighbour the less share of what is choiceworthy andcontrariwise of what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, andin like manner when adjudging the rights of two other men.
Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjustis excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, inviolation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess anddefect because it aims at producing excess and defect; excess, that is,in a man's own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of whatis hurtful: and in the case of other men in like manner generallyspeaking, only that the proportionate is violated not always in onedirection as before but whichever way it happens in the given case. Andof the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly towards, and thegreater the acting unjustly towards others.
Let this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, andlikewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.
[Sidenote: VI] Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet haveformed a character of injustice, the question arises whether a man isunjust in each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer,or robber, by doing acts of a given character.
We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference; aman may, for instance, have had connection with another's wife, knowingwell with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of deliberatechoice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts unjustly, buthe has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that is, he may havestolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of adultery but still notbe an adulterer, and so on in other cases which might be enumerated.
Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have alreadyspoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we areinvestigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited inSocial Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live incommunion with a view to independence and who are free and equal eitherproportionately or numerically.
It follows then that those who are not in this position have not amongthemselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resemblingthat other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law thepossibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishingbetween the Just and the Unjust.
And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among thesethere is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely thatinjustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of actingunjustly, since by the former we mean giving one's self the larger shareof what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly evil.
[Sidenote: 134b] This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allowa man to govern, but Principle, because a man governs for himself andcomes to be a despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of theJust and therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have nopeculiar personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this casehe does not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedlygood unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason hereally governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not toone's self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), thereforesome compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shapeof honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate thererulers turn into despots.
But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is notidentical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibilityof injustice towards those things which are absolutely one's own; anda slave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and notseparated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man'sself, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannotbe injustice towards one's own self: therefore neither is there thesocial Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law andto exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these weresaid to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being ruled.
Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than betweena man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising indomestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.
[Sidenote: VII] Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds,natural and conventional; the former being that which has everywhere thesame force and does not depend upon being received or not; the latterbeing that which originally may be this way or that indifferently butnot after enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed ata mina, or the sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, allcases of special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; inshort, all matters of special decree.
But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latterkind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, isunchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance,burns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they seechanged in various places.
Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the godsperhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is somewhatexisting by nature: allowing that everything is subject to change, stillthere is that which does exist by nature, and that which does not.
Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what amongthings which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does notbut is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even grantingthat both are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctiveillustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand isnaturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong inboth.
[Sidenote: 1135a] A parallel may be drawn between the Justs whichdepend upon convention and expedience, and measures; for wine and cornmeasures are not equal in all places, but where men buy they are large,and where these same sell again they are smaller: well, in like mannerthe Justs which are not natural, but of human invention, are noteverywhere the same, for not even the forms of government are, and yetthere is one only which by nature would be best in all places.
Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody andexemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the actsbeing many, but each of the principles only singular because each is anuniversal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and theabstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a thingis unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this has beenembodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then, onlysome unjust thing. And similarly of a just act. (Perhaps [Greek:dikaiopragaema] is more correctly the common or generic term for justact, the word [Greek: dikaioma], which I have here used, meaninggenerally and properly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now asto each of them, what kinds there are, and how many, and what is theirobject-matter, we must examine afterwards.
[Sidenote: VIII] For the present we proceed to say that, the Justsand the Unjusts being what have been mentioned, a man is said to actunjustly or justly when he embodies these abstracts in voluntaryactions, but when in involuntary, then he neither acts unjustly orjustly except accidentally; I mean that the being just or unjust isreally only accidental to the agents in such cases.
So both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary orthe contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, thenit is blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, ifvoluntariness does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itselfunjust but not yet an unjust action.
By voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in hisown power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as tothe person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result withwhich he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes himwith, and with what probable result; and each of these points again, notaccidentally nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to seizehis hand and strike a third person with it, here, of course, the ownerof the hand acts not voluntarily, because it did not rest with him to door leave undone: or again, it is conceivable that the person struck maybe his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one of thepresent company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is hisfather. And let these same distinctions be supposed to be carried intothe case of the result and in fact the whole of any given action. Infine then, that is involuntary which is done through ignorance, orwhich, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent's control or isdone on compulsion.
I mention these cases, because there are many natural *[Sidenote:1135b] things which we do and suffer knowingly but still no one ofwhich is either voluntary or involuntary, growing old, or dying, forinstance.
Again, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to thejust acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was depositedwith him, but against his will and from fear of the consequences ofa refusal: we must not say that he either does what is just, or doesjustly, except accidentally: and in like manner the man who throughcompulsion and against his will fails to restore a deposit, must be saidto do unjustly, or to do what is unjust, accidentally only.
Again, voluntary actions we do either from deliberate choice or withoutit; from it, when we act from previous deliberation; without it, whenwithout any previous deliberation. Since then hurts which may be done intransactions between man and man are threefold, those mistakes which areattended with ignorance are, when a man either does a thing not to theman to whom he meant to do it, or not the thing he meant to do, or notwith the instrument, or not with the result which he intended: either hedid not think he should hit him at all, or not with this, or this is notthe man he thought he should hit, or he did not think this would bethe result of the blow but a result has followed which he did notanticipate; as, for instance, he did it not to wound but merely to prickhim; or it is not the man whom, or the way in which, he meant.
Now when the hurt has come about contrary to all reasonable expectation,it is a Misadventure; when though not contrary to expectation yetwithout any viciousness, it is a Mistake; for a man makes a mistake whenthe origination of the cause rests with himself, he has a misadventurewhen it is external to himself. When again he acts with knowledge, butnot from previous deliberation, it is an unjust action; for instance,whatever happens to men from anger or other passions which are necessaryor natural: for when doing these hurts or making these mistakes they actunjustly of course and their actions are unjust, still they are not yetconfirmed unjust or wicked persons by reason of these, because the hurtdid not arise from depravity in the doer of it: but when it does arisefrom deliberate choice, then the doer is a confirmed unjust and depravedman.
And on this principle acts done from anger are fairly judged not to befrom malice prepense, because it is not the man who acts in wrath whois the originator really but he who caused his wrath. And again,the question at issue in such cases is not respecting the fact butrespecting the justice of the case, the occasion of anger being a notionof injury. I mean, that the parties do not dispute about the fact, as inquestions of contract (where one of the two must be a rogue, unless realforgetfulness can be pleaded), but, admitting the fact, they dispute onwhich side the justice of the case lies (the one who plotted against theother, i.e. the real aggressor, of course, cannot be ignorant), sothat the one thinks there is injustice committed while the other doesnot.
[Sidenote: 11364] Well then, a man acts unjustly if he has hurt anotherof deliberate purpose, and he who commits such acts of injustice isipso facto an unjust character when they are in violation of theproportionate or the equal; and in like manner also a man is a justcharacter when he acts justly of deliberate purpose, and he does actjustly if he acts voluntarily.
Then as for involuntary acts of harm, they are either such as areexcusable or such as are not: under the former head come all errors donenot merely in ignorance but from ignorance; under the latter all thatare done not from ignorance but in ignorance caused by some passionwhich is neither natural nor fairly attributable to human infirmity.
[Sidenote: IX] Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken withsufficient distinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealingunjustly towards others. First, whether the case is possible whichEuripides has put, saying somewhat strangely,
"My mother he hath slain; the tale is short, Either he willingly did slay her willing, Or else with her will but against his own."
I mean then, is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealtwith with his own consent, or must every case of being unjustly dealtwith be against the will of the sufferer as every act of unjust dealingis voluntary?
And next, are cases of being unjustly dealt with to be ruled all one wayas every act of unjust dealing is voluntary? or may we say that somecases are voluntary and some involuntary?
Similarly also as regards being justly dealt with: all just acting isvoluntary, so that it is fair to suppose that the being dealt withunjustly or justly must be similarly opposed, as to being eithervoluntary or involuntary.
Now as for being justly dealt with, the position that every case of thisis voluntary is a strange one, for some are certainly justly dealtwith without their will. The fact is a man may also fairly raise thisquestion, whether in every case he who has suffered what is unjust istherefore unjustly dealt with, or rather that the case is the same withsuffering as it is with acting; namely that in both it is possible toparticipate in what is just, but only accidentally. Clearly the case ofwhat is unjust is similar: for doing things in themselves unjust is notidentical with acting unjustly, nor is suffering them the same as beingunjustly dealt with. So too of acting justly and being justly dealtwith, since it is impossible to be unjustly dealt with unless some oneelse acts unjustly or to be justly dealt with unless some one else actsjustly.
Now if acting unjustly is simply "hurting another voluntarily" (by whichI mean, knowing whom you are hurting, and wherewith, and how you arehurting him), and the man who fails of self-control voluntarily hurtshimself, then this will be a case of being voluntarily dealt unjustlywith, and it will be possible for a man to deal unjustly with himself.(This by the way is one of the questions raised, whether it is possiblefor a man to deal unjustly with himself.) Or again, a man may, byreason of failing of self-control, receive hurt from another man actingvoluntarily, and so here will be another case of being unjustly dealtwith voluntarily. [Sidenote: 1136]
The solution, I take it, is this: the definition of being unjustly dealtwith is not correct, but we must add, to the hurting with the knowledgeof the person hurt and the instrument and the manner of hurting him, thefact of its being against the wish of the man who is hurt.
So then a man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjustvoluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be: since noman wishes to be hurt, not even he who fails of self-control, who reallyacts contrary to his wish: for no man wishes for that which he does notthink to be good, and the man who fails of self-control does not whathe thinks he ought to do.
And again, he that gives away his own property (as Homer says Glaucusgave to Diomed, "armour of gold for brass, armour worth a hundred oxenfor that which was worth but nine") is not unjustly dealt with, becausethe giving rests entirely with himself; but being unjustly dealt withdoes not, there must be some other person who is dealing unjustlytowards him.
With respect to being unjustly dealt with then, it is clear that it isnot voluntary.
There remain yet two points on which we purposed to speak: first, is hechargeable with an unjust act who in distribution has given the largershare to one party contrary to the proper rate, or he that has thelarger share? next, can a man deal unjustly by himself?
In the first question, if the first-named alternative is possible andit is the distributor who acts unjustly and not he who has the largershare, then supposing that a person knowingly and willingly gives moreto another than to himself here is a case of a man dealing unjustly byhimself; which, in fact, moderate men are thought to do, for it is acharacteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due.
Is not this the answer? that the case is not quite fairly stated,because of some other good, such as credit or the abstract honourable,in the supposed case the man did get the larger share. And again, thedifficulty is solved by reference to the definition of unjust dealing:for the man suffers nothing contrary to his own wish, so that, on thisscore at least, he is not unjustly dealt with, but, if anything, he ishurt only.
It is evident also that it is the distributor who acts unjustly and notthe man who has the greater share: because the mere fact of the abstractUnjust attaching to what a man does, does not constitute unjust action,but the doing this voluntarily: and voluntariness attaches to thatquarter whence is the origination of the action, which clearly is in thedistributor not in the receiver. And again the term doing is used inseveral senses; in one sense inanimate objects kill, or the hand, orthe slave by his master's bidding; so the man in question does not actunjustly but does things which are in themselves unjust.
[Sidenote: 1137a] Again, suppose that a man has made a wrongful awardin ignorance; in the eye of the law he does not act unjustly nor ishis awarding unjust, but yet he is in a certain sense: for the Justaccording to law and primary or natural Just are not coincident: but, ifhe knowingly decided unjustly, then he himself as well as the receivergot the larger share, that is, either of favour from the receiver orprivate revenge against the other party: and so the man who decidedunjustly from these motives gets a larger share, in exactly the samesense as a man would who received part of the actual matter of theunjust action: because in this case the man who wrongly adjudged, say afield, did not actually get land but money by his unjust decision.
Now men suppose that acting Unjustly rests entirely with themselves,and conclude that acting Justly is therefore also easy. But this is notreally so; to have connection with a neighbour's wife, or strike one'sneighbour, or give the money with one's hand, is of course easy andrests with one's self: but the doing these acts with certain inwarddispositions neither is easy nor rests entirely with one's self. And inlike way, the knowing what is Just and what Unjust men think no greatinstance of wisdom because it is not hard to comprehend those thingsof which the laws speak. They forget that these are not Just actions,except accidentally: to be Just they must be done and distributed ina certain manner: and this is a more difficult task than knowing whatthings are wholesome; for in this branch of knowledge it is an easymatter to know honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, or the use of the knife,but the knowing how one should administer these with a view to health,and to whom and at what time, amounts in fact to being a physician.
From this very same mistake they suppose also, that acting Unjustly isequally in the power of the Just man, for the Just man no less, nay evenmore, than the Unjust, may be able to do the particular acts; he may beable to have intercourse with a woman or strike a man; or the brave manto throw away his shield and turn his back and run this way or that.True: but then it is not the mere doing these things which constitutesacts of cowardice or injustice (except accidentally), but the doing themwith certain inward dispositions: just as it is not the mere using ornot using the knife, administering or not administering certain drugs,which constitutes medical treatment or curing, but doing these things ina certain particular way.
Again the abstract principles of Justice have their province among thosewho partake of what is abstractedly good, and can have too much or toolittle of these. Now there are beings who cannot have too much of them,as perhaps the gods; there are others, again, to whom no particle ofthem is of use, those who are incurably wicked to whom all things arehurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree: for thisreason then the province of Justice is among Men.
[Sidenote: 1137b] We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable,that is to say, of the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitableto the Just; for when we look into the matter the two do not appearidentical nor yet different in kind; and we sometimes commend theEquitable and the man who embodies it in his actions, so that by way ofpraise we commonly transfer the term also to other acts instead of theterm good, thus showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better itis: at other times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at adifficulty, in that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yetpraiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or theEquitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if bothare good then they are identical.
This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on thesegrounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these maybe reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable isJust, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better thanthe Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and Equitablethen are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is the better ofthe two.
What causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not theJust which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a correctionof that kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every law isnecessarily universal while there are some things which it is notpossible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement.Where then there is a necessity for general statement, while a generalstatement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes thegenerality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; andrightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, orin the framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of the thing,because the matter of all action is necessarily such.
When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises acase of exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as thelawgiver omits the case and by reason of his universality of statementis wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver himselfwould rule were he there present, and would have provided by law had heforeseen the case would arise. And so the Equitable is Just but betterthan one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but the errorwhich arises out of the universality of statement: and this is thenature of the Equitable, "a correction of Law, where Law is defective byreason of its universality."
This is the reason why not all things are according to law, becausethere are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law,and so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speakgenerally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also, justas the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this ruleshifts according to the form of each stone and the special enactmentaccording to the facts of the case in question.
[Sidenote: 1138a] It is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that itis Just but better than one form of Just: and hence it appears too whothe Equitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carryout these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the lawon the worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backedby the law: and this moral state is Equity, being a species of Justice,not a different moral state from Justice.
XI
The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, "whetherit is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself," is obvious fromwhat has been already stated. In the first place, one class of Justs isthose which are enforced by law in accordance with Virtue in the mostextensive sense of the term: for instance, the law does not bid a mankill himself; and whatever it does not bid it forbids: well, whenever aman does hurt contrary to the law (unless by way of requital of hurt),voluntarily, i.e. knowing to whom he does it and wherewith, he actsUnjustly. Now he that from rage kills himself, voluntarily, does thisin contravention of Right Reason, which the law does not permit. Hetherefore acts Unjustly: but towards whom? towards the Community, nottowards himself (because he suffers with his own consent, and no man canbe Unjustly dealt with with his own consent), and on this principle theCommunity punishes him; that is a certain infamy is attached to thesuicide as to one who acts Unjustly towards the Community.
Next, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a manis Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for thetwo things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as thecoward is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the fullextent of the term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this sense),because if it were so then it would be possible for the same thing tohave been taken away from and added to the same person: but this isreally not possible, the Just and the Unjust always implying a pluralityof persons.
Again, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose,and aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered andis merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but herethe man does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.
Again, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with withone's own consent.
And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act fallingunder some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own wife,commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property. Afterall, the general answer to the question is to allege what was settledrespecting being Unjustly dealt with with one's own consent.
It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealingUnjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, theother having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that ofthe healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art oftraining: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of thetwo, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy; wickedness, Imean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary wrong impliesinjustice), but the being Unjustly dealt by does not involve wickednessor injustice.
[Sidenote: 1138b] In itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is theleast bad, but accidentally it may be the greater evil of the two.However, scientific statement cannot take in such considerations; apleurisy, for instance, is called a greater physical evil than a bruise:and yet this last may be the greater accidentally; it may chance that abruise received in a fall may cause one to be captured by the enemy andslain.
Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I donot say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts ofhis nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to therelation of master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. Forall through this treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewedas distinct from the irrational.
Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be apossibility of injustice towards one's self, because herein it ispossible for men to suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses reallytheir own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain kindbetween these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled.
Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which werecognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.