I
Next we must take a different point to start from, and observe that ofwhat is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are threeforms; Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two formerit is plain what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, theother Self-Control; and as answering to Brutishness it will be mostsuitable to assign Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, inHomer, Priam says of Hector "that he was very excellent, nor was he likethe offspring of mortal man, but of a god." and so, if, as is commonlysaid, men are raised to the position of gods by reason of very highexcellence in Virtue, the state opposed to the Brutish will plainly beof this nature: because as brutes are not virtuous or vicious so neitherare gods; but the state of these is something more precious than Virtue,of the former something different in kind from Vice.
And as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (aterm the Lacedaemonians are accustomed to use when they admire a manexceedingly; [Greek:seios anh鎝] they call him), so the brutish man israre; the character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of itare caused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice allordinary measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term. Well,we must in a subsequent place make some mention of this disposition,and Vice has been spoken of before: for the present we must speak ofImperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness and Luxury, onthe one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the other; since weare to conceive of them, not as being the same states exactly as Virtueand Vice respectively, nor again as differing in kind. [Sidenote:1145b]And we should adopt the same course as before, i.e. state the phenomena,and, after raising and discussing difficulties which suggest themselves,then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions afloat respecting theseaffections of the moral character; or, if not all, the greater part andthe most important: for we may consider we have illustrated the mattersufficiently when the difficulties have been solved, and such theoriesas are most approved are left as a residuum.
The chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,
I. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things goodand praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong tothat of things low and blameworthy.
II. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt toabide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with himwho is apt to depart from his resolution.
III. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at theinstigation of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man ofSelf-Control, knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influenceof reason, to follow their suggestions.
IV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities ofSelf-Control and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites theseis a man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.
V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has noSelf-Control, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control, while othersdistinguish between them.
VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be aman of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are PracticallyWise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.
VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simplybut with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, ofhonour, and gain.
These then are pretty well the common statements.
II
Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conceptionin violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.
That he can so fail when knowing in the strict sense what is rightsome say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought,that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else shouldmaster him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contendedgenerally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as thatof Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what is bestconceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is best.
With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is atvariance with plain facts, and we must inquire with respect to theaffection, if it be caused by ignorance what is the nature of theignorance: for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to beright before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.
There are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: thatnothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man actsin contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree;and so they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which theman in question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.
[Sidenote:1146a] But then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that isit the opposing conception be not strong but only mild (as in the caseof real doubt), the not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts wouldbe excusable: but wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything whichdeserves blame.
Well then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition:for that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, forwe shall have the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and ImperfectSelf-Control, and surely no single person would maintain that it isconsistent with the character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily whatis very wrong; and besides we have shown before that the very mark ofa man of this character is aptitude to act, as distinguished frommere knowledge of what is right; because he is a man conversant withparticular details, and possessed of all the other virtues.
Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea ofthe man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the manof Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad onesdoes not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the manof Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the moralstate which should hinder a man from following their suggestions must bebad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good: suppose them onthe other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be nothing grand; noranything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.
Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions withoutexception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: andif Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all withoutexception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that ofNeoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to bepraised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, becausehe was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
Or again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for becausemen wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever when theysucceed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a difficulty: for theintellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to abide by the conclusionbecause it does not please his judgment, but unable to advance becausehe cannot disentangle the web of sophistical reasoning.
Or again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined withImperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for byreason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way whichcontradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good isbad and ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is goodand not what is bad.
Again, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction pursuesand chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a betterman than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational conviction butof Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to cure by reason ofthe possibility of his receiving a contrary conviction. But to the manof Imperfect Self-Control would apply the proverb, "when water chokes,what should a man drink then?" for had he never been convinced at allin respect of [Sidenote: 1146b] what he does, then by a conviction in acontrary direction he might have stopped in his course; but now thoughhe has had convictions he notwithstanding acts against them.
Again, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect andPerfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply?because no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some menare so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are so.
Well, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have describedthem, and of these theories we must remove some and leave others asestablished; because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act ofestablishing something as true.
III
Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act witha knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge, inwhat sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of theman of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I mean,whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones; and asto Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of thesame character or different. And in like manner we must go into allquestions which are connected with the present.
But the real starting point of the inquiry is, whether the twocharacters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguishedby their object-matter, or their respective relations to it. I mean,whether the man of Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue ofhaving such and such object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his beingrelated to it in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next,whether Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in theirobject-matter: because he who is designated without any addition a manof Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his object-matter, but hasexactly the same as the man who has lost all Self-Control: nor is he sodesignated because of his relation to this object-matter merely (forthen his character would be identical with that just mentioned, lossof all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being suchand such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on withdeliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasureas it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think thathe ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same.
Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge incontravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no differenceto the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions haveno doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge;if then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely thanmen who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions,as having but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will notdiffer in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe theirown Opinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge:Heraclitus is a case in point.
Rather the following is the account of it: the term knowing has twosenses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does,are said to know: there will be a difference between a man's actingwrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it intooperation, and his doing so who has it and actually exercises it: thelatter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising,presents no anomaly.
[Sidenote:1147a] Again, as there are two kinds of propositions affectingaction, universal and particular, there is no reason why a man may notact against his Knowledge, having both propositions in his mind, usingthe universal but not the particular, for the particulars are theobjects of moral action.
There is a difference also in universal propositions; a universalproposition may relate partly to a man's self and partly to the thing inquestion: take the following for instance; "dry food is good for everyman," this may have the two minor premisses, "this is a man," and "soand so is dry food;" but whether a given substance is so and so a maneither has not the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to thesedifferent senses there will be an immense difference, so that for aman to know in the one sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothingstrange, but in any of the other senses it would be a matter for wonder.
Again, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those whichhave been now stated: for we constantly see a man's state so differingby having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense and alsohas not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk: well, menunder the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar conditions;for anger, lust, and some other such-like things, manifestly makechanges even in the body, and in some they even cause madness; it isplain then that we must say the men of Imperfect Self-Control are in astate similar to these.
And their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actuallythen exercising it, because they who are under the operation of thesepassions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles, just aschildren, when first learning, string words together, but as yet knownothing of their meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is aprocess requiring time: so that we must suppose these men who fail inSelf-Control to say these moral sayings just as actors do. Furthermore,a man may look at the account of the ph鎛omenon in the following way,from an examination of the actual working of the mind: All action maybe analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss is an universalmaxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense [moral orphysical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one results fromthese two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory goes the mindmust assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions the man mustact accordingly. For instance, let the universal be, "All that issweet should be tasted," the particular, "This is sweet;" it followsnecessarily that he who is able and is not hindered should not onlydraw, but put in practice, the conclusion "This is to be tasted." Whenthen there is in the mind one universal proposition forbidding to taste,and the other "All that is sweet is pleasant" with its minor "This issweet" (which is the one that really works), and desire happens to be inthe man, the first universal bids him avoid this but the desire leadshim on to taste; for it has the power of moving the various organs:and so it results that he fails in Self-Control, [Sidenote:1147b] in acertain sense under the influence of Reason and Opinion not contrary initself to Reason but only accidentally so; because it is the desire thatis contrary to Right Reason, but not the Opinion: and so for this reasonbrutes are not accounted of Imperfect Self-Control, because they haveno power of conceiving universals but only of receiving and retainingparticular impressions.
As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man ofImperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the sameas with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar tothis affection, so physiologists are the right people to apply to. Butwhereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an opinion onmatter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he who is underthe influence of passion either has not this, or so has it that hishaving does not amount to knowing but merely saying, as a man whendrunk might repeat Empedocles' verses; and because the minor termis neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of producingKnowledge in like manner as the universal term: and so the result whichSocrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the affection does nottake place in the presence of that which is thought to be speciallyand properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged about by reason of theaffection, but in the presence of that Knowledge which is conveyed bySense.
Let this account then be accepted of the question respecting the failurein Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge or not; and, if withknowledge, with what kind of knowledge such failure is possible.
IV
The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to bedesignated by the term "of Imperfect Self-Control" simply, or whetherall who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particularthing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.
Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men ofSelf-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect Self-Controland Softness, is plain.
Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objectsof choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily thingswhich produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which relateto food and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily things aswe assumed were the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control and ofPerfected Self-Mastery.
The other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice inthemselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and such-likegood or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their liking forsuch things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which is in theirown breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect Self-Control simply,but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of money, orgain, or honour, or anger, and not simply; because we consider them asdifferent characters and only having that title in right of a kind ofresemblance (as when we add to a man's name "conqueror in the Olympicgames" the account of him as Man differs but little from the accountof him as the Man who conquered in the Olympic games, but still it isdifferent). And a proof of the real [Sidenote: 1148a] difference betweenthese so designated with an addition and those simply so called is this,that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely but alsoas being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these othercases is so blamed.
But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,which we say are also the object-matter of the man of PerfectedSelf-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursuesexcessive pleasures and too much avoids things which are painful (ashunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with touchand taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral choice andintellectual conviction, is termed "a man of Imperfect Self-Control,"not with the addition of any particular object-matter as we do inrespect of want of control of anger but simply.
And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term"Soft" is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of anyof those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the manof Imperfect Self-Control, the man who has lost it entirely, the manwho has it, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery; but not any of thoseother characters, because the former have for their object-matter thesame pleasures and pains: but though they have the same object-matter,they are not related to it in the same way, but two of them act uponmoral choice, two without it. And so we should say that man is moreentirely given up to his passions who pursues excessive pleasures, andavoids moderate pains, being either not at all, or at least but little,urged by desire, than the man who does so because his desire is verystrong: because we think what would the former be likely to do if he hadthe additional stimulus of youthful lust and violent pain consequent onthe want of those pleasures which we have denominated necessary?
Well then, since of desires and pleasures there are some which are inkind honourable and good (because things pleasant are divisible, as wesaid before, into such as are naturally objects of choice, such asare naturally objects of avoidance, and such as are in themselvesindifferent, money, gain, honour, victory, for instance); in respect ofall such and those that are indifferent, men are blamed not merely forbeing affected by or desiring or liking them, but for exceeding in anyway in these feelings.
And so they are blamed, whosoever in spite of Reason are mastered by,that is pursue, any object, though in its nature noble and good; they,for instance, who are more earnest than they should be respectinghonour, or their children or parents; not but what these are goodobjects and men are praised for being earnest about them: but still theyadmit of excess; for instance, if any one, as Niobe did, should fighteven against the gods, or feel towards his father as Satyrus, who gottherefrom the nickname of [Greek: philophator], [Sidenote: 1148b]because he was thought to be very foolish.
Now depravity there is none in regard of these things, for the reasonassigned above, that each of them in itself is a thing naturallychoiceworthy, yet the excesses in respect of them are wrong and matterfor blame: and similarly there is no Imperfect Self-Control in respectof these things; that being not merely a thing that should be avoidedbut blameworthy.
But because of the resemblance of the affection to the Imperfection ofSelf-Control the term is used with the addition in each case of theparticular object-matter, just as men call a man a bad physician, or badactor, whom they would not think of calling simply bad. As then in thesecases we do not apply the term simply because each of the states is nota vice, but only like a vice in the way of analogy, so it is plain thatin respect of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control we must limit thenames to those states which have the same object-matter as PerfectedSelf-Mastery and utter loss of Self-Control, and that we do apply it tothe case of anger only in the way of resemblance: for which reason, withan addition, we designate a man of Imperfect Self-Control in respect ofanger, as of honour or of gain.
V
As there are some things naturally pleasant, and of these two kinds;those, namely, which are pleasant generally, and those which are sorelatively to particular kinds of animals and men; so there are otherswhich are not naturally pleasant but which come to be so in consequenceeither of maimings, or custom, or depraved natural tastes: and one mayobserve moral states similar to those we have been speaking of, havingrespectively these classes of things for their object-matter.
I mean the Brutish, as in the case of the female who, they say, wouldrip up women with child and eat the foetus; or the tastes which arefound among the savage tribes bordering on the Pontus, some liking rawflesh, and some being cannibals, and some lending one another theirchildren to make feasts of; or what is said of Phalaris. These areinstances of Brutish states, caused in some by disease or madness; take,for instance, the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or him whodevoured the liver of his fellow-servant. Instances again of thosecaused by disease or by custom, would be, plucking out of hair, oreating one's nails, or eating coals and earth. ... Now wherever natureis really the cause no one would think of calling men of ImperfectSelf-Control, ... nor, in like manner, such as are in a diseased statethrough custom.
[Sidenote:1149a] Obviously the having any of these inclinations issomething foreign to what is denominated Vice, just as Brutishness is:and when a man has them his mastering them is not properly Self-Control,nor his being mastered by them Imperfection of Self-Control in theproper sense, but only in the way of resemblance; just as we may say aman of ungovernable wrath fails of Self-Control in respect of anger butnot simply fails of Self-Control. For all excessive folly, cowardice,absence of Self-Control, or irritability, are either Brutish or morbid.The man, for instance, who is naturally afraid of all things, even ifa mouse should stir, is cowardly after a Brutish sort; there was a managain who, by reason of disease, was afraid of a cat: and of the fools,they who are naturally destitute of Reason and live only by Sense areBrutish, as are some tribes of the far-off barbarians, while otherswho are so by reason of diseases, epileptic or frantic, are in morbidstates.
So then, of these inclinations, a man may sometimes merely have onewithout yielding to it: I mean, suppose that Phalaris had restrained hisunnatural desire to eat a child: or he may both have and yield to it. Asthen Vice when such as belongs to human nature is called Vice simply,while the other is so called with the addition of "brutish" or "morbid,"but not simply Vice, so manifestly there is Brutish and MorbidImperfection of Self-Control, but that alone is entitled to the namewithout any qualification which is of the nature of utter absence ofSelf-Control, as it is found in Man.
VI
It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control andSelf-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence ofSelf-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest isthe object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and notsimply: we will now examine the position, "that Imperfect Self-Controlin respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts."
In the first place, it seems that Anger does in a way listen to Reasonbut mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heardthe whole of what is said and then mistake the order; dogs, again, barkat the slightest stir, before they have seen whether it be friendor foe; just so Anger, by reason of its natural heat and quickness,listening to Reason, but without having heard the command of Reason,rushes to its revenge. That is to say, Reason or some impression on themind shows there is insolence or contempt in the offender, and thenAnger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what issuch, fires up immediately: whereas Lust, if Reason or Sense, as thecase may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment ofit: and so Anger follows Reason in a manner, but Lust does not and istherefore more disgraceful: because he that cannot control his angeryields in a manner to Reason, but the other to his Lust and not toReason at all. [Sidenote:1149b]
Again, a man is more excusable for following such desires as arenatural, just as he is for following such Lusts as are common to all andto that degree in which they are common. Now Anger and irritability aremore natural than Lusts when in excess and for objects not necessary.(This was the ground of the defence the man made who beat his father,"My father," he said, "used to beat his, and his father his again, andthis little fellow here," pointing to his child, "will beat me when heis grown a man: it runs in the family." And the father, as he was beingdragged along, bid his son leave off beating him at the door, because hehad himself been used to drag his father so far and no farther.)
Again, characters are less unjust in proportion as they involve lessinsidiousness. Now the Angry man is not insidious, nor is Anger, butquite open: but Lust is: as they say of Venus,
"Cyprus-born Goddess, weaver of deceits"
Or Homer of the girdle called the Cestus,
"Persuasiveness cheating e'en the subtlest mind."
And so since this kind of Imperfect Self-Control is more unjust, itis also more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and is simplyImperfect Self-Control, and Vice in a certain sense. Again, no man feelspain in being insolent, but every one who acts through Anger does actwith pain; and he who acts insolently does it with pleasure. If thenthose things are most unjust with which we have most right to be angry,then Imperfect Self-Control, arising from Lust, is more so than thatarising from Anger: because in Anger there is no insolence.
Well then, it is clear that Imperfect Self-Control in respect ofLusts is more disgraceful than that in respect of Anger, and that theobject-matter of Self-Control, and the Imperfection of it, are bodilyLusts and pleasures; but of these last we must take into account thedifferences; for, as was said at the commencement, some are proper tothe human race and natural both in kind and degree, others Brutish, andothers caused by maimings and diseases.
Now the first of these only are the object-matter of PerfectedSelf-Mastery and utter absence of Self-Control; and therefore we neverattribute either of these states to Brutes (except metaphorically,and whenever any one kind of animal differs entirely from another ininsolence, mischievousness, or voracity), because they have not moralchoice or process of deliberation, but are quite different from thatkind of creature just as are madmen from other men.
[Sidenote: 1150a] Brutishness is not so low in the scale as Vice, yetit is to be regarded with more fear: because it is not that the highestprinciple has been corrupted, as in the human creature, but the subjecthas it not at all.
It is much the same, therefore, as if one should compare an inanimatewith an animate being, which were the worse: for the badness of thatwhich has no principle of origination is always less harmful; nowIntellect is a principle of origination. A similar case would be thecomparing injustice and an unjust man together: for in different wayseach is the worst: a bad man would produce ten thousand times as muchharm as a bad brute.
VII
Now with respect to the pleasures and pains which come to a man throughTouch and Taste, and the desiring or avoiding such (which we determinedbefore to constitute the object-matter of the states of utter absence ofSelf-Control and Perfected Self-Mastery), one may be so disposed asto yield to temptations to which most men would be superior, or tobe superior to those to which most men would yield: in respect ofpleasures, these characters will be respectively the man of ImperfectSelf-Control, and the man of Self-Control; and, in respect of pains, theman of Softness and the man of Endurance: but the moral state of mostmen is something between the two, even though they lean somewhat to theworse characters.
Again, since of the pleasures indicated some are necessary and some arenot, others are so to a certain degree but not the excess or defect ofthem, and similarly also of Lusts and pains, the man who pursues theexcess of pleasant things, or such as are in themselves excess, or frommoral choice, for their own sake, and not for anything else which is toresult from them, is a man utterly void of Self-Control: for he must beincapable of remorse, and so incurable, because he that has not remorseis incurable. (He that has too little love of pleasure is the oppositecharacter, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery the mean character.) Heis of a similar character who avoids the bodily pains, not because hecannot, but because he chooses not to, withstand them.
But of the characters who go wrong without choosing so to do, the oneis led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain itwould cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one fromthe other. Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing somethingbase without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight one, than fordoing the same from the impulse of a very strong desire; for strikinga man when not angry than if he did so in wrath: because one naturallysays, "What would he have done had he been under the influence ofpassion?" (and on this ground, by the bye, the man utterly void ofSelf-Control is worse than he who has it imperfectly). However, of thetwo characters which have been mentioned [as included in that of utterabsence of Self-Control], the one is rather Softness, the other properlythe man of no Self-Control.
Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed thatof Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: becauseEndurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actualmastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as differentas not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is morechoiceworthy than Endurance.
[Sidenote:1150b] Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptationsagainst which the common run of men hold out, and are well able to doso, is Soft and Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind ofman, I mean, to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the troubleof lifting it, and who, aping the sick man, does not however supposehimself wretched though he is like a wretched man. So it is too withrespect to Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields topleasures or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter forwonder, but rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could(instances are, Philoctetes in Theodectes' drama when wounded by theviper; or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying tosuppress laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened,you remember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a manyields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which thecommon herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to beowing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kingsare constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.
Again, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to bedestitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusementis an act of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character inquestion is one of those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.
Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy andWeakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have maderesolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others areled by passion because they have never formed any resolutions atall: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselvesbeforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand theapproach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution,yield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant orsomewhat painful. The Precipitate form of Imperfect Self-Control theyare most liable to who are constitutionally of a sharp or melancholytemperament: because the one by reason of the swiftness, the other byreason of the violence, of their passions, do not wait for Reason,because they are disposed to follow whatever notion is impressed upontheir minds.
VIII
Again, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observedbefore, is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character thathe abides by his moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control isalmost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined itbefore, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: fordepravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for instance,but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the former being acontinuous evil, the latter not so. And, in fact, Imperfect Self-Controland Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the latter being imperceptibleto its victim, the former not so.
[Sidenote: 1151a] But, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control,those are better who are carried off their feet by a sudden access oftemptation than they who have Reason but do not abide by it; theselast being overcome by passion less in degree, and not wholly withoutpremeditation as are the others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Controlis like those who are soon intoxicated and by little wine and less thanthe common run of men. Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control isnot Confirmed Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way,because in one sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another theresult of it: at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is muchlike what Demodocus said of the Miletians. "The people of Miletus arenot fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;" and sothey of Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.
But to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such acharacter as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance ofRight Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas theman utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction whichrests on his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; theformer may be easily persuaded to a different course, but the latternot: for Virtue and Vice respectively preserve and corrupt the moralprinciple; now the motive is the principle or starting point in moralactions, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics: and neitherin morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is apt to teach theprinciple; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by custom, inholding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does this inmorals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary characteris the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defianceof Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as toprevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as tomake him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after suchpleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect Self-Control, better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a badman simply and without qualification: because in him the highest andbest part, i.e. principle, is preserved: and there is another characteropposed to him who is apt to abide by his resolutions, and not to departfrom them; at all events, not at the instigation of passion. It isevident then from all this, that Self-Control is a good state and theImperfection of it a bad one.
Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control forabiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind theymay, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect Self-Controlfor not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of whateverkind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such for not abiding byfalse conclusions and wrong moral choice?
Is not this the truth, that incidentally it is by conclusions andmoral choice of any kind that the one character abides and the otherdoes not, but per se true conclusions and right moral choice: toexplain what is meant by incidentally, and per se; suppose a manchooses or pursues this thing for the sake of that, he is said to pursueand choose that per se, but this only incidentally. For the term perse we use commonly the word "simply," and so, in a way, it is opinionof any kind soever by which the two characters respectively abide ornot, but he is "simply" entitled to the designations who abides or notby the true opinion.
There are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, ownopinions, who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard tobe persuaded, and whose convictions are not easily changed: now thesepeople bear some resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just asthe prodigal to the liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they aredifferent in many points. The man of Self-Control does not change byreason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will beeasy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call ofReason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led bytheir pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated, theIgnorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure andpain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of victory innot having their convictions changed, and they are pained when theirdecrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they ratherresemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of Self-Control.
Again, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason ofany Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in thePhiloctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of hisdeparture from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort:for to be truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded byUlysses to lie.
So it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who isutterly destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control,only he who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.
Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he oughtin bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion ofhis Reason, the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the manof Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to abide bythem because of somewhat too much, the former because of somewhat toolittle; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and never changesby reason of anything else than such conclusions.
Now of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States mustbe bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seenin few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to beviewed as if opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just asPerfected Self-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to utter want ofSelf-Control.
[Sidenote: 1152a] Again, as many terms are used in the way ofsimilitude, so people have come to talk of the Self-Control of the manof Perfected Self-Mastery in the way of similitude: for the man ofSelf-Control and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery have this in common,that they do nothing against Right Reason on the impulse of bodilypleasures, but then the former has bad desires, the latter not; and thelatter is so constituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to hisReason, the former feels but does not yield to it. Like again are theman of Imperfect Self-Control and he who is utterly destitute of it,though in reality distinct: both follow bodily pleasures, but the latterunder a notion that it is the proper line for him to take, his formerwithout any such notion.
X
And it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of PracticalWisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character of PracticalWisdom includes, as we showed before, goodness of moral character.And again, it is not knowledge merely, but aptitude for action, whichconstitutes Practical Wisdom: and of this aptitude the man of ImperfectSelf-Control is destitute. But there is no reason why the Clever manshould not be of Imperfect Self-Control: and the reason why some men areoccasionally thought to be men of Practical Wisdom, and yet of ImperfectSelf-Control, is this, that Cleverness differs from Practical Wisdom inthe way I stated in a former book, and is very near it so far as theintellectual element is concerned but differs in respect of the moralchoice.
Nor is the man of Imperfect Self-Control like the man who both has andcalls into exercise his knowledge, but like the man who, having it, isoverpowered by sleep or wine. Again, he acts voluntarily (because heknows, in a certain sense, what he does and the result of it), but he isnot a confirmed bad man, for his moral choice is good, so he is at allevents only half bad. Nor is he unjust, because he does not act withdeliberate intent: for of the two chief forms of the character, the oneis not apt to abide by his deliberate resolutions, and the other, theman of constitutional strength of passion, is not apt to deliberate atall.
So in fact the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like a community whichmakes all proper enactments, and has admirable laws, only does not acton them, verifying the scoff of Anaxandrides,
"That State did will it, which cares nought for laws;"whereas the bad man is like one which acts upon its laws, but thenunfortunately they are bad ones. Imperfection of Self-Control andSelf-Control, after all, are above the average state of men; because heof the latter character is more true to his Reason, and the former lessso, than is in the power of most men.
Again, of the two forms of Imperfect Self-Control that is more easilycured which they have who are constitutionally of strong passions, thanthat of those who form resolutions and break them; and they that are sothrough habituation than they that are so naturally; since of coursecustom is easier to change than nature, because the very resemblance ofcustom to nature is what constitutes the difficulty of changing it; asEvenus says,
"Practice, I say, my friend, doth long endure, And at the last is even very nature."
We have now said then what Self-Control is, what Imperfection ofSelf-Control, what Endurance, and what Softness, and how these statesare mutually related.
XI
[Sidenote: II52b]
To consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain falls within the provinceof the Social-Science Philosopher, since he it is who has to fix theMaster-End which is to guide us in dominating any object absolutely evilor good.
But we may say more: an inquiry into their nature is absolutelynecessary. First, because we maintained that Moral Virtue and Moral Viceare both concerned with Pains and Pleasures: next, because the greaterpart of mankind assert that Happiness must include Pleasure (which bythe way accounts for the word they use, makarioz; chaireiu being theroot of that word).
Now some hold that no one Pleasure is good, either in itself or as amatter of result, because Good and Pleasure are not identical. Othersthat some Pleasures are good but the greater number bad. There is yet athird view; granting that every Pleasure is good, still the Chief Goodcannot possibly be Pleasure.
In support of the first opinion (that Pleasure is utterly not-good) itis urged that:
I. Every Pleasure is a sensible process towards a complete state; butno such process is akin to the end to be attained: e.g. no process ofbuilding to the completed house.
2. The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures.
3. The man of Practical Wisdom aims at avoiding Pain, not at attainingPleasure.
4. Pleasures are an impediment to thought, and the more so the morekeenly they are felt. An obvious instance will readily occur.
5. Pleasure cannot be referred to any Art: and yet every good is theresult of some Art.
6. Children and brutes pursue Pleasures.
In support of the second (that not all Pleasures are good), That thereare some base and matter of reproach, and some even hurtful: becausesome things that are pleasant produce disease.
In support of the third (that Pleasure is not the Chief Good), That itis not an End but a process towards creating an End.
This is, I think, a fair account of current views on the matter.
XII
But that the reasons alleged do not prove it either to be not-good orthe Chief Good is plain from the following considerations.
First. Good being either absolute or relative, of course the natures andstates embodying it will be so too; therefore also the movements and theprocesses of creation. So, of those which are thought to be badsome will be bad absolutely, but relatively not bad, perhaps evenchoiceworthy; some not even choiceworthy relatively to any particularperson, only at certain times or for a short time but not in themselveschoiceworthy.
Others again are not even Pleasures at all though they produce thatimpression on the mind: all such I mean as imply pain and whose purposeis cure; those of sick people, for instance.
Next, since Good may be either an active working or a state, those[Greek: kinaeseis or geneseis] which tend to place us in our naturalstate are pleasant incidentally because of that *[Sidenote: 1153a]tendency: but the active working is really in the desires excited in theremaining (sound) part of our state or nature: for there are Pleasureswhich have no connection with pain or desire: the acts of contemplativeintellect, for instance, in which case there is no deficiency in thenature or state of him who performs the acts.
A proof of this is that the same pleasant thing does not produce thesensation of Pleasure when the natural state is being filled up orcompleted as when it is already in its normal condition: in this lattercase what give the sensation are things pleasant per se, in the formereven those things which are contrary. I mean, you find people takingpleasure in sharp or bitter things of which no one is naturally or initself pleasant; of course not therefore the Pleasures arising fromthem, because it is obvious that as is the classification of pleasantthings such must be that of the Pleasures arising from them.
Next, it does not follow that there must be something else better thanany given pleasure because (as some say) the End must be better thanthe process which creates it. For it is not true that all Pleasuresare processes or even attended by any process, but (some are) activeworkings or even Ends: in fact they result not from our coming to besomething but from our using our powers. Again, it is not true that theEnd is, in every case, distinct from the process: it is true only inthe case of such processes as conduce to the perfecting of the naturalstate.
For which reason it is wrong to say that Pleasure is "a sensible processof production." For "process etc." should be substituted "active workingof the natural state," for "sensible" "unimpeded." The reason of itsbeing thought to be a "process etc." is that it is good in the highestsense: people confusing "active working" and "process," whereas theyreally are distinct.
Next, as to the argument that there are bad Pleasures because somethings which are pleasant are also hurtful to health, it is the same assaying that some healthful things are bad for "business." In this sense,of course, both may be said to be bad, but then this does not makethem out to be bad simpliciter: the exercise of the pure Intellectsometimes hurts a man's health: but what hinders Practical Wisdom orany state whatever is, not the Pleasure peculiar to, but some Pleasureforeign to it: the Pleasures arising from the exercise of the pureIntellect or from learning only promote each.
Next. "No Pleasure is the work of any Art." What else would you expect?No active working is the work of any Art, only the faculty of soworking. Still the perfumer's Art or the cook's are thought to belong toPleasure.
Next. "The man of Perfected Self-Mastery avoids Pleasures." "The manof Practical Wisdom aims at escaping Pain rather than at attainingPleasure."
"Children and brutes pursue Pleasures."
One answer will do for all.
We have already said in what sense all Pleasures are good per se andin what sense not all are good: it is the latter class that brutes andchildren pursue, such as are accompanied by desire and pain, that is thebodily Pleasures (which answer to this description) and the excesses ofthem: in short, those in respect of which the man utterly destitute ofSelf-Control is thus utterly destitute. And it is the absence of thepain arising from these Pleasures that the man of Practical Wisdomaims at. It follows that these Pleasures are what the man of PerfectedSelf-Mastery avoids: for obviously he has Pleasures peculiarly his own.
[Sidenote: XIII 1153b] Then again, it is allowed that Pain is an eviland a thing to be avoided partly as bad per se, partly as being ahindrance in some particular way. Now the contrary of that which is tobe avoided, qu?it is to be avoided, i.e. evil, is good. Pleasurethen must be a good.
The attempted answer of Speusippus, "that Pleasure may be opposed andyet not contrary to Pain, just as the greater portion of any magnitudeis contrary to the less but only opposed to the exact half," will nothold: for he cannot say that Pleasure is identical with evil of anykind. Again. Granting that some Pleasures are low, there is no reasonwhy some particular Pleasure may not be very good, just as someparticular Science may be although there are some which are low.
Perhaps it even follows, since each state may have active workingunimpeded, whether the active workings of all be Happiness or that ofsome one of them, that this active working, if it be unimpeded, must bechoiceworthy: now Pleasure is exactly this. So that the Chief Good maybe Pleasure of some kind, though most Pleasures be (let us assume) lowper se.
And for this reason all men think the happy life is pleasant, andinterweave Pleasure with Happiness. Reasonably enough: because Happinessis perfect, but no impeded active working is perfect; and thereforethe happy man needs as an addition the goods of the body and the goodsexternal and fortune that in these points he may not be fettered. As forthose who say that he who is being tortured on the wheel, or falls intogreat misfortunes is happy provided only he be good, they talk nonsense,whether they mean to do so or not. On the other hand, because fortuneis needed as an addition, some hold good fortune to be identical withHappiness: which it is not, for even this in excess is a hindrance, andperhaps then has no right to be called good fortune since it is goodonly in so far as it contributes to Happiness.
The fact that all animals, brute and human alike, pursue Pleasure, issome presumption of its being in a sense the Chief Good;
("There must be something in what most folks say,") only as one andthe same nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, soneither do all pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do.Nay further, what they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor whatthey would say they pursue, but really one and the same: for in allthere is some instinct above themselves. But the bodily Pleasures havereceived the name exclusively, because theirs is the most frequent formand that which is universally partaken of; and so, because to many thesealone are known they believe them to be the only ones which exist.
[Sidenote: II54a]
It is plain too that, unless Pleasure and its active working be good, itwill not be true that the happy man's life embodies Pleasure: for whywill he want it on the supposition that it is not good and that he canlive even with Pain? because, assuming that Pleasure is not good, thenPain is neither evil nor good, and so why should he avoid it?
Besides, the life of the good man is not more pleasurable than any otherunless it be granted that his active workings are so too.
XIV
Some inquiry into the bodily Pleasures is also necessary for those whosay that some Pleasures, to be sure, are highly choiceworthy (the goodones to wit), but not the bodily Pleasures; that is, those which are theobject-matter of the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
If so, we ask, why are the contrary Pains bad? they cannot be (on theirassumption) because the contrary of bad is good.
May we not say that the necessary bodily Pleasures are good in the sensein which that which is not-bad is good? or that they are good only upto a certain point? because such states or movements as cannot have toomuch of the better cannot have too much of Pleasure, but those which canof the former can also of the latter. Now the bodily Pleasures do admitof excess: in fact the low bad man is such because he pursues the excessof them instead of those which are necessary (meat, drink, and theobjects of other animal appetites do give pleasure to all, but not inright manner or degree to all). But his relation to Pain is exactly thecontrary: it is not excessive Pain, but Pain at all, that he avoids[which makes him to be in this way too a bad low man], because onlyin the case of him who pursues excessive Pleasure is Pain contrary toexcessive Pleasure.
It is not enough however merely to state the truth, we should also showhow the false view arises; because this strengthens conviction. I mean,when we have given a probable reason why that impresses people as truewhich really is not true, it gives them a stronger conviction of thetruth. And so we must now explain why the bodily Pleasures appear topeople to be more choiceworthy than any others.
The first obvious reason is, that bodily Pleasure drives out Pain; andbecause Pain is felt in excess men pursue Pleasure in excess, i.e.generally bodily Pleasure, under the notion of its being a remedy forthat Pain. These remedies, moreover, come to be violent ones; which isthe very reason they are pursued, since the impression they produceon the mind is owing to their being looked at side by side with theircontrary.
And, as has been said before, there are the two following reasons whybodily Pleasure is thought to be not-good.
1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whethercongenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.
2. Others are in the nature of cures, cures that is of some deficiency;now of course it is better to have [the healthy state] originally thanthat it should accrue afterwards.
[Sidenote: 1154b] But some Pleasures result when natural states arebeing perfected: these therefore are good as a matter of result.
Again, the very fact of their being violent causes them to be pursued bysuch as can relish no others: such men in fact create violent thirstsfor themselves (if harmless ones then we find no fault, if harmful thenit is bad and low) because they have no other things to takepleasure in, and the neutral state is distasteful to some peopleconstitutionally; for toil of some kind is inseparable from life, asphysiologists testify, telling us that the acts of seeing or hearing arepainful, only that we are used to the pain and do not find it out.
Similarly in youth the constant growth produces a state much likethat of vinous intoxication, and youth is pleasant. Again, men of themelancholic temperament constantly need some remedial process (becausethe body, from its temperament, is constantly being worried), and theyare in a chronic state of violent desire. But Pleasure drives out Pain;not only such Pleasure as is directly contrary to Pain but even anyPleasure provided it be strong: and this is how men come to be utterlydestitute of Self-Mastery, i.e. low and bad.
But those Pleasures which are unconnected with Pains do not admit ofexcess: i.e. such as belong to objects which are naturally pleasantand not merely as a matter of result: by the latter class I mean suchas are remedial, and the reason why these are thought to be pleasant isthat the cure results from the action in some way of that part of theconstitution which remains sound. By "pleasant naturally" I mean such asput into action a nature which is pleasant.
The reason why no one and the same thing is invariably pleasant is thatour nature is, not simple, but complex, involving something differentfrom itself (so far as we are corruptible beings). Suppose then that onepart of this nature be doing something, this something is, to the otherpart, unnatural: but, if there be an equilibrium of the two natures,then whatever is being done is indifferent. It is obvious that if therebe any whose nature is simple and not complex, to such a being the samecourse of acting will always be the most pleasurable.
For this reason it is that the Divinity feels Pleasure which is alwaysone, i.e. simple: not motion merely but also motionlessness acts, andPleasure resides rather in the absence than in the presence of motion.
The reason why the Poet's dictum "change is of all things most pleasant"is true, is "a baseness in our blood;" for as the bad man is easilychangeable, bad must be also the nature that craves change, i.e. it isneither simple nor good.
We have now said our say about Self-Control and its opposite; and aboutPleasure and Pain. What each is, and how the one set is good the otherbad. We have yet to speak of Friendship.