[Sidenote: I 1155a] Next would seem properly to follow a dissertationon Friendship: because, in the first place, it is either itself a virtueor connected with virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary forlife, since no one would choose to live without friends though he shouldhave all the other good things in the world: and, in fact, men who arerich or possessed of authority and influence are thought to have specialneed of friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there betaken away the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usualand most commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved withoutfriends? because the greater it is so much the more slippery andhazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men thinkfriends to be their only refuge.
Furthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, inrespect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weaknessmakes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect ofnoble deeds ("They two together going," Homer says, you may remember),because they are thus more able to devise plans and carry them out.
Again, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, inthe parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent(not merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and mostanimals), and in those of the same tribe towards one another, andspecially in men of the same nation; for which reason we commend thosemen who love their fellows: and one may see in the course of travel howclose of kin and how friendly man is to man.
Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, andlegislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. Imean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainlyaim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.
Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required; but, onthe other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition,and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of thenature of Friendship.
Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: sincewe praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friendsis thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that"good man" and "friend" are terms synonymous.
Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay downthat it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one anotherare friends: whence come the common sayings, "Like will to like," "Birdsof a feather," and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all suchcome under the maxim, "Two of a trade never agree."
[Sidenote: 1155b] Again, some men push their inquiries on these pointshigher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says,
"The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain, And the great heaven, overcharged with rain, Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth."
Heraclitus, again, maintains, that "contrariety is expedient, and thatthe best agreement arises from things differing, and that all thingscome into being in the way of the principle of antagonism."
Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that"like aims at like."
These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as theyare foreign to the present inquiry; and we will examine such as areproper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, forinstance, "Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is itimpossible for bad men to be friends?" and, "Is there but one species ofFriendship, or several?" for they who ground the opinion that there isbut one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees hold that uponinsufficient proof; because things which are different in species admitlikewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken before).
II
Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertainedwhat is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought thatnot everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is theobject of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable,or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through which accruesany good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship, as absoluteEnds, are the good and the pleasurable.
A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which isgood to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two beingsometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. Itseems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good tohimself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the objectof Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. Itcomes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for whatis but for that which conveys to his mind the impression of beinggood to himself. But this will make no real difference, because thatwhich is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this impressionto the mind.
There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the termis not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate becausethere is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good of thoseobjects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a man fondof wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true being thathe wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and benefit. Butto the friend they say one should wish all good for his sake. And whenmen do thus wish good to another (he not *[Sidenote: 1156a]reciprocating the feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendshipthey describe as being "Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it."But must they not add that the feeling must be mutually known? for manymen are kindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whomthey conceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to thesame thing as a real feeling between them.
Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how canone call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to oneanother? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite thatthey have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another goodfrom one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelingsshould be mutually known.
III
As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respectivefeelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, innumber equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there maybe "mutual affection mutually known."
Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another's goodaccording to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whosemotive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only inso far as some good arises to them from one another.
And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they haveFriendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a givencharacter but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then theywhose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what isgood to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what ispleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friendbeloved is but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. TheseFriendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not belovedin that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage orpleasure as the case may be. Such Friendships are of course very liableto dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that theothers cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no longerpleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to bepermanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive whichmade them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; sinceit existed only relatively to those circumstances.
Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable butwhat is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of theyoung, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have nointimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are noteven pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire suchintercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because theyare pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. Withthese Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality.
But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motiveof pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of passion andgenerally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of thepresent moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures.
This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly: sincethe Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasurechanges quickly.
[Sidenote: 1156b] The young are also much given up to Love; this passionbeing, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: forwhich cause they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changingoften in the same day: but these wish for society and intimateintercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object oftheir Friendship.
That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who aregood and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wishone another's good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and goodthey are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish goodto their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them ontheir own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendshipbetween these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; andgoodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence.
Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to hisfriend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also usefulto one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable becauseall good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another,inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable whichcorrespond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when menare good these will be always the same, or at least similar.
Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we shouldreasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisitequalifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind isbased upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to theperson entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from asimilarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementionedrequisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties aresimilar, and so on: moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good andthe abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matterof Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship is found mostintense and most excellent in men thus qualified.
Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because menof this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications beingpresupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as theproverb says, men cannot know one another "till they have eaten therequisite quantity of salt together;" nor can they in fact admit oneanother to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared tothe other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They whospeedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wishto be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objectsof Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desirefor Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.
IV
Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in allother points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to eachparty from the other; which ought to be the case between friends.
[Sidenote: II57a] The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so tosay, a copy of this, since the good are sources of pleasure to oneanother: and that based on utility likewise, the good being alsouseful to one another. Between men thus connected Friendships aremost permanent when the same result accrues to both from one another,pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the same source, asin the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of alover and the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasurefrom the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter and thelatter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the bloomof youth fades the Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then thelover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object of his affectionceases to receive the attentions which were paid before: in many cases,however, people so connected continue friends, if being of similartempers they have come from custom to like one another's disposition.
Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love,the Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:in fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part whenthe advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of oneanother but of the advantage.
So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men maybe friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutralcharacter to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for thesake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; becausebad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as someadvantage arises.
And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;it not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting onewhom they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutualconfidence, and the feeling that one's friend would never have done onewrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship reallyworthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent allsuch suspicions.
I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name offriends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which isjustified by political language, for alliances between states arethought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who areattached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), wemay perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and say thereare several species of Friendship; primarily and specially that ofthe good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way ofresemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that wayin which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual resemblance(because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those who are fondof it).
These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that isto say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantageand by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are notoften combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds, bad[Sidenote: 1157b] men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit,this being their point of resemblance; while the good are friends forone another's sake, that is, in so far as they are good.
These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former asa matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to theselast.
V
Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termedgood in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of actsof working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who livetogether take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they whoare asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are insuch a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distancehas in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents theacting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to causea forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it has been said,"many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse destroy."
Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated forFriendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one canspend his days in company with that which is positively painful or evennot pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurableis one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get onwith one another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, arerather like people having kindly feelings towards one another thanfriends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the living withone another, because the necessitous desire assistance, and the happycompanionship, they being the last persons in the world for solitaryexistence: but people cannot spend their time together unless they aremutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a qualitywhich is thought to appertain to the Friendship of companionship.
The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship parexcellence, as has already been frequently said: since that which isabstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendshipand choiceworthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him;and the good man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now theentertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itselflike a state: because the former may have for its object even thingsinanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral choicewhich proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to theobjects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a merefeeling but of moral state.).
And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch asthe good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to himwith whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his owngood, and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in thepleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well, thesepoints belong most to the Friendship between good men.
But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure inintercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendlyand productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unlessthey take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect oftheir needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neitherspend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, whichcircumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.
To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, isnot possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; andbesides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleasedwith many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good.Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy,which is very difficult.
But it is possible to please many on the score of advantage andpleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services maybe rendered in a very short time.
Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is theFriendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue fromboth and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; suchas are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is mostfound in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connectinglink of shopkeepers.
Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to liveintimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Gooditself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out forpleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also;and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they willhave all the proper requisites of Friendship.
Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are notoften united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combinepleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourablepurposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out formen of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executingany business put into their hands: and these qualifications are notcommonly found united in the same man.
It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities ofpleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend toa superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this benot the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make thingsequal by a proportionate degree of Friendship. And characters who unitesuperiority of station and goodness are not common. Now all the kindsof Friendship which have been already mentioned exist in a state ofequality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and theywish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thingagainst another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has beensaid already that Friendships of this latter kind are less intense indegree and less permanent.
And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing whichmakes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show likeFriendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue(the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, bothof which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show likeFriendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; whichunlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and sopermanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.
VII
But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the oneparty is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder andyounger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one fromanother: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not thesame as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towardsthe son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wifeas she towards him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, ofeach of these is different, and different therefore are the causes oftheir feeling Friendship; distinct and different therefore are theirfeelings and states of Friendship.
And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in factought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parentswhat they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sonswhat they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such partieswill be permanent and equitable.
Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in allFriendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the betterman, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of astronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling ofFriendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certainsense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in Friendship.
(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same caseas regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactlyproportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal rankssecond, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
[Sidenote: 1159a] And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shownby the occurrence of a great difference of goodness or badness, orprosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are not anylonger friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. Theclearest illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they aremost superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case ofkings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled tobe friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends tothose of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases itis out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they maycontinue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and theFriendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very farseparated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.
This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to theirfriends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods: because, incase the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them forfriends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had, becausefriends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friendwishes to his friend good things for that friend's sake, it must beunderstood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to say, hewill wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is capable: yetperhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all.
VIII
It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish ratherto be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain itthemselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flattererbeing a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather toentertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to be himselfthe object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly the same asbeing honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men seem to choosehonour, not for its own sake, but incidentally: I mean, the common runof men delight to be honoured by those in power because of the hope itraises; that is they think they shall get from them anything they mayhappen to be in want of, so they delight in honour as an earnest offuture benefit. They again who grasp at honour at the hands of the goodand those who are really acquainted with their merits desire to confirmtheir own opinion about themselves: so they take pleasure in theconviction that they are good, which is based on the sentence of thosewho assert it. But in being the objects of Friendship men delight forits own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being honouredand Friendship to be in itself choiceworthy. Friendship, moreover, isthought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, thesentiment of Friendship, which is proved by the delight mothers have inthe feeling: some there are who give their children to be adopted andbrought up by others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards themnever seeking to have it returned, if both are not possible; but seemingto be content with seeing them well off and bearing this feelingthemselves towards them, even though they, by reason of ignorance, neverrender to them any filial regard or love.
Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in beingthe object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of theirfriends, it seems that entertaining--*[Sidenote: II59b]the sentiment isthe Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in dueproportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because theymay thus be made equal.
Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and speciallythe similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable inthemselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degradingservices nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it isthe part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow theirfriends in so doing.
The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, theydo not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends fora short time from taking delight in one another's wickedness. Thoseconnected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhatlonger: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profitmutually.
The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of allformed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus afriend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; thatis to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may referthe lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For thisreason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to be theobjects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of courseif they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps entitledto claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is ridiculous.
Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its ownsake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it beinggood for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain themean, and so of the hot, etc. However, let us drop these questions,because they are in fact somewhat foreign to our purpose.
IX
It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship andJustice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the samepersons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be someprinciple of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and inlike manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in otherways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive withthe Communion, This justifies the common proverb, "the goods of friendsare common," since Friendship rests upon Communion.
[1160a] Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, butother people have their property separate, and some have more in commonand others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. Sotoo do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the samebetween parents and children as between brothers, nor between companionsas between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the otherconceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of Injusticeas regards these different grades, and the acts become intensified bybeing done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob your companionthan one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help to a brotherthan to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one else. So thenthe Justice naturally increases with the degree of Friendship, as beingbetween the same parties and of equal extent.
All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to procuresome of those things which are needful for life; and the great SocialCommunion is thought originally to have been associated and tocontinue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at whichlegislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient.All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which isundertaken with a view to making money, or some such object; comrades inwar at that which is to result from the war, grasping either at wealthor victory, or it may be a political position; and those of the sametribe, or Demus, in like manner.
Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure's sake, those, forinstance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view toSacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged underthe great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely theexpediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a viewto which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendantassemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselvesrespite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears thatsacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind offirst-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such seasonsthey had most leisure.
So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of thegreat Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon suchCommunions.
X
Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in numberare the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.
The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises theprinciple of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (Igive to it the name of a political constitution because people commonlydo so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.
[Sidenote: II6ob] From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both beingMonarchies but widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks tohis own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is infact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the restin all good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he willnot then have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects,for he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot forthe nonce.
But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because theDespot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiorityis most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. TheTransition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a corruptform of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a Despot.
From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of theRulers in distributing the public property contrary to right proportion;and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share, tothemselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making wealththeir idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place of thebest.
From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the leastvicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoesleast change.
Well, these are generally the changes to which the various Constitutionsare liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to make.
Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even inDomestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his Sonspresents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the Father'scare: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is intendedto be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the Father's rule isDespotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The relation of Masterto Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the point regardedherein is the Master's interest): this now strikes me to be as it ought,but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for different personsthere should be different rules. [Sidenote: 1161a] Between Husband andWife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy, because he rules byright and in such points only as the Husband should, and gives tothe Wife all that befits her to have. Where the Husband lords it ineverything he changes the relation into an Oligarchy; because he doesit contrary to right and not as being the better of the two. In someinstances the Wives take the reins of government, being heiresses: herethe rule is carried on not in right of goodness but by reason of wealthand power, as it is in Oligarchies.
Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equalexcept as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, ifthey are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longera fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by familieswhich have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper headis weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.
XI
Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly isFriendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; thatbetween a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiorityof benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed thathe is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tendshis flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, "shepherdof the people." And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, onlythat it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed thegreatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things arealso, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law ofnature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors overtheir descendants, and the king over his subjects.
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for whichreason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle ofJustice also between these parties is not exactly the same but accordingto proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as inAristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, andthe better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so tooalso is the principle of Justice between them.
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothersare equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally likefeelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of aTimocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable:rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is distributed on equalterms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.
[Sidenote: 1161b] In the deflections from the constitutional forms, justas the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: andleast of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is littleor no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled havenothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice;but the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul andbody, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who usethem, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship norJustice: nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave qu?slave,because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool,a tool an inanimate slave. Qu?slave, then, there is no Friendshiptowards him, only qu?man: for it is thought that there is someprinciple of Justice between every man, and every other who can share inlaw and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in sofar as he is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle ofJustice are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are mostconsiderable because they who are equal have much in common.
XII
Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has beenalready stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the restthe Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of menof the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist inright of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rankalso the Friendship of Hospitality,
The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in allits varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love theirchildren as being a part of themselves, children love their parents asbeing themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know theiroffspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and thesource is more closely bound to that which is produced than that whichis produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derivedfrom one's self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, forinstance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him thathas it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferiordegree at least.
Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love theiroffspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspringthem only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligenceor instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers havegreater strength of affection than fathers.
Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derivedfrom themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of separation),but children their parents as being sprung from them. And brothers loveone another from being sprung from the same; that is, their samenesswith the common stock creates a sameness with one another; whence comethe phrases, "same blood," "root," and so on. In fact they are the same,in a sense, even in the separate distinct individuals.
Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, area great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age andpersons who are used to one another are companions, which accountsfor the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that ofCompanions.
[Sidenote:1162a] And cousins and all other relatives derive their bondof union from these, that is to say, from their community of origin: andthe strength of this bond varies according to their respective distancesfrom the common ancestor.
Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by mentowards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; becausethese have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they arethe causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having beeneducated after they were brought into being.
And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitablemore than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion astheir life is also more shared in common. Then again in the FraternalFriendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more inthe good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as theyare more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling ofaffection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like indisposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up togetherand been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatestopportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and cantherefore depend most securely upon the trial. The elementsof Friendship between other consanguinities will be of courseproportionably similar.
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law ofnature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate inCommunities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time andmore absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is morecommon to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communionthus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake ofprocreation but also with a view to life in general: because in thisconnection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to theman, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what ispeculiar to each into the common stock.
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine theprofitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue ifthey are good people; because each has goodness and they may takedelight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be atie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are agood common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.
The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) onefriend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is justthat they should: because plainly there is not the same principleof Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, orcompanions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.
XIII
[Sidenote:1162b] There are then, as was stated at the commencement ofthis book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friendson a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior andinferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, becomefriends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again,because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly theirmutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then,those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised alsoby the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those whoare on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion tothe superiority of the other party.
Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, inFriendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends byreason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another becausethis is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men arevying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding norcontention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him thesentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refinedmind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the twoexceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not findfault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends forpleasure's sake: because supposing them to delight in living togetherthen both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in aridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasinghim, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. Butthe Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, therequirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have lessthan of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justlyentitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do thekindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom theyare being done.
It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and thelegal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what maybe called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source ofcomplaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them notin the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat moregentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a quid pro quo.
In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, thefriendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for thisreason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for therecovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on thefooting of credit must be content to abide the issue.
That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specifiedconditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still heexpects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had notgiven but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get theobligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.
[Sidenote:1163a] Now this results from the fact, that all men, or thegenerality at least, wish what is honourable, but, when tested,choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedlyis honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases oneshould, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, anddo so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend ofa man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made amistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one oughtnot to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the actdisinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one's self of theobligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if ablea man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable eventhe doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able heought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whomone is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that sameunderstanding one may accept it or not.
A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindnessby the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard bywhich to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciationthat they have received from their benefactors such things as were smallfor them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others:while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best theyhad, and what could not have been got from others, and under danger, orin such-like straits.
May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship theadvantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he itis who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on theunderstanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance renderedis then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver hasobtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, oreven more, this being more creditable.
In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is neverraised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the properstandard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.
XIV
Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties areunequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share,and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.
The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greatershare pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to thegood man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another thanthat other to him: "one who is useless," they say, "ought not to shareequally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruitsof the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:" theirnotion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute morereceive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.
On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance theopposite claim: they urge that "it is the very business of a good friendto help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good orpowerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?"
[Sidenote: 1163b] Now each seems to advance a right claim and to beentitled to get more out of the connection than the other, only notmore of the same thing: but the superior man should receive morerespect, the needy man more profit: respect being the reward of goodnessand beneficence, profit being the aid of need.
This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities:he receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for theproperty of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, andhonour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to makemoney out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one willput up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss asregards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid bygifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportionequalises and preserves Friendship.
Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends whoare unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, orgoodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according tohis power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what isstrictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honourspaid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due returnin these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respectaccording to his ability.
For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son todisown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owesis bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fullyrequite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so isalways a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off theirdebtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it mustperhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever would sever himselfutterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because,independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not toput away from one's self the assistance which a son might render. But tothe son, if depraved, assisting his father is a thing to be avoided, orat least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most menbeing willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it asunprofitable.
Let thus much suffice on these points.