I
[Sidenote: 1164a] Well, in all the Friendships the parties to which aredissimilar it is the proportionate which equalises and preserves theFriendship, as has been already stated: I mean, in the Social Friendshipthe cobbler, for instance, gets an equivalent for his shoes after acertain rate; and the weaver, and all others in like manner. Now inthis case a common measure has been provided in money, and to thisaccordingly all things are referred and by this are measured: but inthe Friendship of Love the complaint is sometimes from the lover that,though he loves exceedingly, his love is not requited; he having perhapsall the time nothing that can be the object of Friendship: again,oftentimes from the object of love that he who as a suitor promised anyand every thing now performs nothing. These cases occur because theFriendship of the lover for the beloved object is based upon pleasure,that of the other for him upon utility, and in one of the parties therequisite quality is not found: for, as these are respectively thegrounds of the Friendship, the Friendship comes to be broken up becausethe motives to it cease to exist: the parties loved not one another butqualities in one another which are not permanent, and so neither are theFriendships: whereas the Friendship based upon the moral character ofthe parties, being independent and disinterested, is permanent, as wehave already stated.
Quarrels arise also when the parties realise different results and notthose which they desire; for the not attaining one's special object isall one, in this case, with getting nothing at all: as in the well-knowncase where a man made promises to a musician, rising in proportion tothe excellence of his music; but when, the next morning, the musicianclaimed the performance of his promises, he said that he had given himpleasure for pleasure: of course, if each party had intended this, itwould have been all right: but if the one desires amusement and theother gain, and the one gets his object but the other not, the dealingcannot be fair: because a man fixes his mind upon what he happens towant, and will give so and so for that specific thing.
The question then arises, who is to fix the rate? the man who firstgives, or the man who first takes? because, prima facie, the man whofirst gives seems to leave the rate to be fixed by the other party.This, they say, was in fact the practice of Protagoras: when he taughta man anything he would bid the learner estimate the worth of theknowledge gained by his own private opinion; and then he used to take somuch from him. In such cases some people adopt the rule,
"With specified reward a friend should be content."
They are certainly fairly found fault with who take the money in advanceand then do nothing of what they said they would do, their promiseshaving been so far beyond their ability; for such men do not performwhat they agreed, The Sophists, however, are perhaps obliged to takethis course, because no one would give a sixpence for their knowledge.These then, I say, are fairly found fault with, because they do not whatthey have already taken money for doing.
[Sidenote: 1164b] In cases where no stipulation as to the respectiveservices is made they who disinterestedly do the first service will notraise the question (as we have said before), because it is the nature ofFriendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention ofthe other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and ofgoodness.
And it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who areconnected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; forhere the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, infact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps itis sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one'sparents.
But where the original giving is not upon these terms but avowedly forsome return, the most proper course is perhaps for the requital to besuch as both shall allow to be proportionate, and, where this cannotbe, then for the receiver to fix the value would seem to be not onlynecessary but also fair: because when the first giver gets that which isequivalent to the advantage received by the other, or to what he wouldhave given to secure the pleasure he has had, then he has the value fromhim: for not only is this seen to be the course adopted in matters ofbuying and selling but also in some places the law does not allow ofactions upon voluntary dealings; on the principle that when one man hastrusted another he must be content to have the obligation discharged inthe same spirit as he originally contracted it: that is to say, it isthought fairer for the trusted, than for the trusting, party, to fix thevalue. For, in general, those who have and those who wish to get thingsdo not set the same value on them: what is their own, and what they givein each case, appears to them worth a great deal: but yet the returnis made according to the estimate of those who have received first, itshould perhaps be added that the receiver should estimate what he hasreceived, not by the value he sets upon it now that he has it, but bythat which he set upon it before he obtained it.
II
Questions also arise upon such points as the following: Whether one'sfather has an unlimited claim on one's services and obedience, orwhether the sick man is to obey his physician? or, in an election ofa general, the warlike qualities of the candidates should be aloneregarded?
In like manner whether one should do a service rather to one's friend orto a good man? whether one should rather requite a benefactor or give toone's companion, supposing that both are not within one's power?
[Sidenote: 1165a] Is not the true answer that it is no easy task todetermine all such questions accurately, inasmuch as they involvenumerous differences of all kinds, in respect of amount and what ishonourable and what is necessary? It is obvious, of course, that no oneperson can unite in himself all claims. Again, the requital of benefitsis, in general, a higher duty than doing unsolicited kindnesses to one'scompanion; in other words, the discharging of a debt is more obligatoryupon one than the duty of giving to a companion. And yet this rule mayadmit of exceptions; for instance, which is the higher duty? for one whohas been ransomed out of the hands of robbers to ransom in return hisransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his demand though he hasnot been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it wouldseem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference tohimself.
Well then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debtshould be discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatlypreponderates as being either honourable or necessary, we must be swayedby these considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of theobligation previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for instance,that the original benefactor has conferred a kindness on a good man,knowing him to be such, whereas this said good man has to repay itbelieving him to be a scoundrel.
And again, in certain cases no obligation lies on a man to lend to onewho has lent to him; suppose, for instance, that a bad man lent to him,as being a good man, under the notion that he should get repaid, whereasthe said good man has no hope of repayment from him being a bad man.Either then the case is really as we have supposed it and then the claimis not equal, or it is not so but supposed to be; and still in so actingpeople are not to be thought to act wrongly. In short, as has beenoftentimes stated before, all statements regarding feelings and actionscan be definite only in proportion as their object-matter is so; it isof course quite obvious that all people have not the same claim uponone, nor are the claims of one's father unlimited; just as Jupiter doesnot claim all kinds of sacrifice without distinction: and since theclaims of parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors, are alldifferent, we must give to each what belongs to and befits each.
And this is seen to be the course commonly pursued: to marriages mencommonly invite their relatives, because these are from a common stockand therefore all the actions in any way pertaining thereto are commonalso: and to funerals men think that relatives ought to assemble inpreference to other people, for the same reason.
And it would seem that in respect of maintenance it is our duty toassist our parents in preference to all others, as being their debtors,and because it is more honourable to succour in these respects theauthors of our existence than ourselves. Honour likewise we ought to payto our parents just as to the gods, but then, not all kinds of honour:not the same, for instance, to a father as to a mother: nor again to afather the honour due to a scientific man or to a general but thatwhich is a father's due, and in like manner to a mother that which is amother's.
To all our elders also the honour befitting their age, by rising up intheir presence, turning out of the way for them, and all similar marksof respect: to our companions again, or brothers, frankness and freeparticipation in all we have. And to those of the same family, or tribe,or city, with ourselves, and all similarly connected with us, we shouldconstantly try to render their due, and to discriminate what belongs toeach in respect of nearness of connection, or goodness, or intimacy:of course in the case of those of the same class the discrimination iseasier; in that of those who are in different classes it is a matter ofmore trouble. This, however, should not be a reason for giving upthe attempt, but we must observe the distinctions so far as it ispracticable to do so.
III
A question is also raised as to the propriety of dissolving or notdissolving those Friendships the parties to which do not remain whatthey were when the connection was formed.
[Sidenote: 1165b] Now surely in respect of those whose motive toFriendship is utility or pleasure there can be nothing wrong in breakingup the connection when they no longer have those qualities; because theywere friends [not of one another, but] of those qualities: and, thesehaving failed, it is only reasonable to expect that they should cease toentertain the sentiment.
But a man has reason to find fault if the other party, being reallyattached to him because of advantage or pleasure, pretended to be sobecause of his moral character: in fact, as we said at the commencement,the most common source of quarrels between friends is their not beingfriends on the same grounds as they suppose themselves to be.
Now when a man has been deceived in having supposed himself to excitethe sentiment of Friendship by reason of his moral character, the otherparty doing nothing to indicate he has but himself to blame: but when hehas been deceived by the pretence of the other he has a right to findfault with the man who has so deceived him, aye even more than withutterers of false coin, in proportion to the greater preciousness ofthat which is the object-matter of the villany.
But suppose a man takes up another as being a good man, who turns out,and is found by him, to be a scoundrel, is he bound still to entertainFriendship for him? or may we not say at once it is impossible? sinceit is not everything which is the object-matter of Friendship, but onlythat which is good; and so there is no obligation to be a bad man'sfriend, nor, in fact, ought one to be such: for one ought not to be alover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what is base; which would beimplied, because we have said before, like is friendly to like.
Are we then to break with him instantly? not in all cases; only whereour friends are incurably depraved; when there is a chance of amendmentwe are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friendseven more than their substance, in proportion as it is better andmore closely related to Friendship. Still he who should break off theconnection is not to be judged to act wrongly, for he never was a friendto such a character as the other now is, and therefore, since the man ischanged and he cannot reduce him to his original state, he backs out ofthe connection.
To put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was whenthe Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved andwidely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved characterto treat the other as a friend?
May we not say it is impossible? The case of course is clearest wherethere is a great difference, as in the Friendships of boys: for supposethat of two boyish friends the one still continues a boy in mind and theother becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be friends?since they neither are pleased with the same objects nor like anddislike the same things: for these points will not belong to them asregards one another, and without them it was assumed they cannot befriends because they cannot live in intimacy: and of the case of thosewho cannot do so we have spoken before.
Well then, is the improved party to bear himself towards his formerfriend in no way differently to what he would have done had theconnection never existed?
Surely he ought to bear in mind the intimacy of past times, and just aswe think ourselves bound to do favours for our friends in preference tostrangers, so to those who have been friends and are so no longer weshould allow somewhat on the score of previous Friendship, whenever thecause of severance is not excessive depravity on their part.
IV
[Sidenote: II66a] Now the friendly feelings which are exhibited towardsour friends, and by which Friendships are characterised, seem to havesprung out of those which we entertain toward ourselves. I mean, peopledefine a friend to be "one who intends and does what is good (or whathe believes to be good) to another for that other's sake," or "one whowishes his friend to be and to live for that friend's own sake" (whichis the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of friends whohave come into collision). Others again, "one who lives with another andchooses the same objects," or "one who sympathises with his friend inhis sorrows and in his joys" (this too is especially the case withmothers).
Well, by some one of these marks people generally characteriseFriendship: and each of these the good man has towards himself, and allothers have them in so far as they suppose themselves to be good. (For,as has been said before, goodness, that is the good man, seems to be ameasure to every one else.)
For he is at unity in himself, and with every part of his soul hedesires the same objects; and he wishes for himself both what is, andwhat he believes to be, good; and he does it (it being characteristicof the good man to work at what is good), and for the sake of himself,inasmuch as he does it for the sake of his Intellectual Principle whichis generally thought to be a man's Self. Again, he wishes himself Andspecially this Principle whereby he is an intelligent being, to live andbe preserved in life, because existence is a good to him that is a goodman.
But it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, and noman, conceiving the possibility of his becoming other than he now is,chooses that that New Self should have all things indiscriminately: agod, for instance, has at the present moment the Chief Good, but he hasit in right of being whatever he actually now is: and the IntelligentPrinciple must be judged to be each man's Self, or at least eminently so[though other Principles help, of course, to constitute him the man heis]. Furthermore, the good man wishes to continue to live with himself;for he can do it with pleasure, in that his memories of past actions arefull of delight and his anticipations of the future are good and suchare pleasurable. Then, again, he has good store of matter for hisIntellect to contemplate, and he most especially sympathises with hisSelf in its griefs and joys, because the objects which give him pain andpleasure are at all times the same, not one thing to-day and a differentone to-morrow: because he is not given to repentance, if one may sospeak. It is then because each of these feelings are entertained by thegood man towards his own Self and a friend feels towards a friend astowards himself (a friend being in fact another Self), that Friendshipis thought to be some one of these things and they are accounted friendsin whom they are found. Whether or no there can really be Friendshipbetween a man and his Self is a question we will not at presententertain: there may be thought to be Friendship, in so far as there aretwo or more of the aforesaid requisites, and because the highest degreeof Friendship, in the usual acceptation of that term, resembles thefeeling entertained by a man towards himself.
[Sidenote: 1166b] But it may be urged that the aforesaid requisites areto all appearance found in the common run of men, though they are men ofa low stamp.
May it not be answered, that they share in them only in so far as theyplease themselves, and conceive themselves to be good? for certainly,they are not either really, or even apparently, found in any one ofthose who are very depraved and villainous; we may almost say noteven in those who are bad men at all: for they are at variance withthemselves and lust after different things from those which in coolreason they wish for, just as men who fail of Self-Control: I mean, theychoose things which, though hurtful, are pleasurable, in preference tothose which in their own minds they believe to be good: others again,from cowardice and indolence, decline to do what still they areconvinced is best for them: while they who from their depravity haveactually done many dreadful actions hate and avoid life, and accordinglykill themselves: and the wicked seek others in whose company to spendtheir time, but fly from themselves because they have many unpleasantsubjects of memory, and can only look forward to others like them whenin solitude but drown their remorse in the company of others: and asthey have nothing to raise the sentiment of Friendship so they neverfeel it towards themselves.
Neither, in fact, can they who are of this character sympathise withtheir Selves in their joys and sorrows, because their soul is, as itwere, rent by faction, and the one principle, by reason of the depravityin them, is grieved at abstaining from certain things, while the otherand better principle is pleased thereat; and the one drags them this wayand the other that way, as though actually tearing them asunder. Andthough it is impossible actually to have at the same time the sensationsof pain and pleasure; yet after a little time the man is sorry forhaving been pleased, and he could wish that those objects had not givenhim pleasure; for the wicked are full of remorse.
It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of afriend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which canexcite the sentiment of Friendship. If then to be thus is exceedinglywretched it is a man's duty to flee from wickedness with all his mightand to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends with himselfand may come to be a friend to another.
[Sidenote: V] Kindly Feeling, though resembling Friendship, is notidentical with it, because it may exist in reference to those whom wedo not know and without the object of it being aware of its existence,which Friendship cannot. (This, by the way, has also been said before.)And further, it is not even Affection because it does not implyintensity nor yearning, which are both consequences of Affection. AgainAffection requires intimacy but Kindly Feeling may arise quite suddenly,as happens sometimes in respect of men against whom people are matchedin any way, I mean they come to be kindly disposed to them andsympathise in their wishes, but still they would not join them in anyaction, because, as we said, they conceive this feeling of kindnesssuddenly and so have but a superficial liking.
What it does seem to be is the starting point of a Friendship; just aspleasure, received through the sight, is the commencement of Love: forno one falls in love without being first pleased with the personalappearance of the beloved object, and yet he who takes pleasure in itdoes not therefore necessarily love, but when he wearies for the objectin its absence and desires its presence. Exactly in the same way mencannot be friends without having passed through the stage of KindlyFeeling, and yet they who are in that stage do not necessarily advanceto Friendship: they merely have an inert wish for the good of thosetoward whom they entertain the feeling, but would not join them inany action, nor put themselves out of the way for them. So that, ina metaphorical way of speaking, one might say that it is dormantFriendship, and when it has endured for a space and ripened intointimacy comes to be real Friendship; but not that whose object isadvantage or pleasure, because such motives cannot produce even KindlyFeeling.
I mean, he who has received a kindness requites it by Kindly Feelingtowards his benefactor, and is right in so doing: but he who wishesanother to be prosperous, because he has hope of advantage through hisinstrumentality, does not seem to be kindly disposed to that person butrather to himself; just as neither is he his friend if he pays court tohim for any interested purpose.
Kindly Feeling always arises by reason of goodness and a certainamiability, when one man gives another the notion of being a finefellow, or brave man, etc., as we said was the case sometimes with thosematched against one another.
[Sidenote: VI] Unity of Sentiment is also plainly connected withFriendship, and therefore is not the same as Unity of Opinion,because this might exist even between people unacquainted with oneanother.
Nor do men usually say people are united in sentiment merely becausethey agree in opinion on any point, as, for instance, on pointsof astronomical science (Unity of Sentiment herein not having anyconnection with Friendship), but they say that Communities have Unity ofSentiment when they agree respecting points of expediency and take thesame line and carry out what has been determined in common consultation.
Thus we see that Unity of Sentiment has for its object matters ofaction, and such of these as are of importance, and of mutual, or, inthe case of single States, common, interest: when, for instance, allagree in the choice of magistrates, or forming alliance with theLaced鎚onians, or appointing Pittacus ruler (that is to say, supposinghe himself was willing). [Sidenote: 1167b] But when each wisheshimself to be in power (as the brothers in the Phoeniss?, they quarreland form parties: for, plainly, Unity of Sentiment does not merely implythat each entertains the same idea be it what it may, but that they doso in respect of the same object, as when both the populace and thesensible men of a State desire that the best men should be in office,because then all attain their object.
Thus Unity of Sentiment is plainly a social Friendship, as it is alsosaid to be: since it has for its object-matter things expedient andrelating to life.
And this Unity exists among the good: for they have it towardsthemselves and towards one another, being, if I may be allowed theexpression, in the same position: I mean, the wishes of such men aresteady and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, and they wish what isjust and expedient and aim at these things in common.
The bad, on the contrary, can as little have Unity of Sentiment as theycan be real friends, except to a very slight extent, desiring as theydo unfair advantage in things profitable while they shirk labour andservice for the common good: and while each man wishes for these thingsfor himself he is jealous of and hinders his neighbour: and as theydo not watch over the common good it is lost. The result is that theyquarrel while they are for keeping one another to work but are notwilling to perform their just share.
[Sidenote: VII] Benefactors are commonly held to have more Friendshipfor the objects of their kindness than these for them: and the factis made a subject of discussion and inquiry, as being contrary toreasonable expectation.
The account of the matter which satisfies most persons is that the oneare debtors and the others creditors: and therefore that, as in the caseof actual loans the debtors wish their creditors out of the way whilethe creditors are anxious for the preservation of their debtors, sothose who have done kindnesses desire the continued existence of thepeople they have done them to, under the notion of getting a returnof their good offices, while these are not particularly anxious aboutrequital.
Epicharmus, I suspect, would very probably say that they who give thissolution judge from their own baseness; yet it certainly is like humannature, for the generality of men have short memories on these points,and aim rather at receiving than conferring benefits.
But the real cause, it would seem, rests upon nature, and the case isnot parallel to that of creditors; because in this there is no affectionto the persons, but merely a wish for their preservation with a view tothe return: whereas, in point of fact, they who have done kindnessesfeel friendship and love for those to whom they have done them, eventhough they neither are, nor can by possibility hereafter be, in aposition to serve their benefactors.
[Sidenote: 1168a] And this is the case also with artisans; every one,I mean, feels more affection for his own work than that work possiblycould for him if it were animate. It is perhaps specially the case withpoets: for these entertain very great affection for their poems, lovingthem as their own children. It is to this kind of thing I should beinclined to compare the case of benefactors: for the object of theirkindness is their own work, and so they love this more than this lovesits creator.
And the account of this is that existence is to all a thing choiceworthyand an object of affection; now we exist by acts of working, that is, byliving and acting; he then that has created a given work exists, it maybe said, by his act of working: therefore he loves his work because heloves existence. And this is natural, for the work produced displays inact what existed before potentially.
Then again, the benefactor has a sense of honour in right of his action,so that he may well take pleasure in him in whom this resides; but tohim who has received the benefit there is nothing honourable in respectof his benefactor, only something advantageous which is both lesspleasant and less the object of Friendship.
Again, pleasure is derived from the actual working out of a presentaction, from the anticipation of a future one, and from the recollectionof a past one: but the highest pleasure and special object of affectionis that which attends on the actual working. Now the benefactor's workabides (for the honourable is enduring), but the advantage of him whohas received the kindness passes away.
Again, there is pleasure in recollecting honourable actions, but inrecollecting advantageous ones there is none at all or much less (by theway though, the contrary is true of the expectation of advantage).
Further, the entertaining the feeling of Friendship is like acting onanother; but being the object of the feeling is like being acted upon.
So then, entertaining the sentiment of Friendship, and all feelingsconnected with it, attend on those who, in the given case of abenefaction, are the superior party.
Once more: all people value most what has cost them much labour in theproduction; for instance, people who have themselves made their moneyare fonder of it than those who have inherited it: and receivingkindness is, it seems, unlaborious, but doing it is laborious. And thisis the reason why the female parents are most fond of their offspring;for their part in producing them is attended with most labour, and theyknow more certainly that they are theirs. This feeling would seem alsoto belong to benefactors.
[Sidenote: VIII] A question is also raised as to whether it is rightto love one's Self best, or some one else: because men find fault withthose who love themselves best, and call them in a disparaging waylovers of Self; and the bad man is thought to do everything he doesfor his own sake merely, and the more so the more depraved he is;accordingly men reproach him with never doing anything unselfish:whereas the good man acts from a sense of honour (and the more so thebetter man he is), and for his friend's sake, and is careless of his owninterest.
[Sidenote: 1168b] But with these theories facts are at variance, andnot unnaturally: for it is commonly said also that a man is to love mosthim who is most his friend, and he is most a friend who wishes good tohim to whom he wishes it for that man's sake even though no one knows.Now these conditions, and in fact all the rest by which a friend ischaracterised, belong specially to each individual in respect of hisSelf: for we have said before that all the friendly feelings are derivedto others from those which have Self primarily for their object. And allthe current proverbs support this view; for instance, "one soul," "thegoods of friends are common," "equality is a tie of Friendship," "theknee is nearer than the shin." For all these things exist specially withreference to a man's own Self: he is specially a friend to himself andso he is bound to love himself the most.
It is with good reason questioned which of the two parties one shouldfollow, both having plausibility on their side. Perhaps then, in respectof theories of this kind, the proper course is to distinguish and definehow far each is true, and in what way. If we could ascertain the sensein which each uses the term "Self-loving," this point might be clearedup.
Well now, they who use it disparagingly give the name to those who,in respect of wealth, and honours, and pleasures of the body, give tothemselves the larger share: because the mass of mankind grasp afterthese and are earnest about them as being the best things; which is thereason why they are matters of contention. They who are covetous inregard to these gratify their lusts and passions in general, that is tosay the irrational part of their soul: now the mass of mankind are sodisposed, for which reason the appellation has taken its rise from thatmass which is low and bad. Of course they are justly reproached who areSelf-loving in this sense.
And that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term todenominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain:suppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than othermen, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and,in general, were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly nobleand honourable, no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.
Yet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainlyhe gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good,and gratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfullyauthoritative, and obeys it in everything: and just as that whichpossesses the highest authority is thought to constitute a Community orany other system, so also in the case of Man: and so he is most trulySelf-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.
Again, men are said to have, or to fail of having, self-control,according as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly impliedthereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people arethought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those thingsspecially which are done with Reason. [Sidenote: 1169a]
It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely orspecially constitute the individual man, and that the good man speciallyloves this. For this reason then he must be specially Self-loving, in akind other than that which is reproached, and as far superior to it asliving in accordance with Reason is to living at the beck and call ofpassion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at apparent advantage.
Now all approve and commend those who are eminently earnest abouthonourable actions, and if all would vie with one another in respect ofthe [Greek: kalhon], and be intent upon doing what is most truly nobleand honourable, society at large would have all that is proper whileeach individual in particular would have the greatest of goods, Virtuebeing assumed to be such.
And so the good man ought to be Self-loving: because by doing what isnoble he will have advantage himself and will do good to others: but thebad man ought not to be, because he will harm himself and his neighboursby following low and evil passions. In the case of the bad man, what heought to do and what he does are at variance, but the good man does whathe ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is best for itselfand the good man puts himself under the direction of Intellect.
Of the good man it is true likewise that he does many things for thesake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying forthem, if need be: for money and honours, and, in short, all the goodthings which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secureto himself the [Greek: kalhon]: he will prefer a brief and great joyto a tame and enduring one, and to live nobly for one year rather thanordinarily for many, and one great and noble action to many triflingones. And this is perhaps that which befals men who die for theircountry and friends; they choose great glory for themselves: and theywill lavish their own money that their friends may receive more, forhereby the friend gets the money but the man himself the [Greek:kalhon]; so, in fact he gives to himself the greater good. It is thesame with honours and offices; all these things he will give up to hisfriend, because this reflects honour and praise on himself: and sowith good reason is he esteemed a fine character since he chooses thehonourable before all things else. It is possible also to give up theopportunities of action to a friend; and to have caused a friend's doinga thing may be more noble than having done it one's self.
In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give tohimself a larger share of the honourable. [Sidenote: 1169b] In thissense it is right to be Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of theterm it is not.
[Sidenote: IX] A question is raised also respecting the Happy man,whether he will want Friends, or no?
Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need ofFriends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as beingindependent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend'soffice is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what hecannot get by himself: hence the saying,
"When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?"
On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happyman all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, afterall, thought to be the greatest of external goods.
Again, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than toreceive kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man andto the character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer kindnesseson friends than strangers, the good man will need objects for hisbenefactions. And out of this last consideration springs a questionwhether the need of Friends be greater in prosperity or adversity, sincethe unfortunate man wants people to do him kindnesses and they who arefortunate want objects for their kind acts.
Again, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, becauseno man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on thecondition of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed bynature for living with others: of course the Happy man has thisqualification since he has all those things which are good by nature:and it is obvious that the society of friends and good men must bepreferable to that of strangers and ordinary people, and we conclude,therefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.
But then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are theyright? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who areuseful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he hasall good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends witha view to the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; becausehis life, being already pleasurable, does not want pleasure importedfrom without; and so, since the Happy man does not need Friends of thesekinds, he is thought not to need any at all.
But it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, thatHappiness is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is somethingthat must come into being, not be already there like a mere piece ofproperty.
[Sidenote: 1170a] If then the being happy consists in living andworking, and the good man's working is in itself excellent andpleasurable (as we said at the commencement of the treatise), and ifwhat is our own reckons among things pleasurable, and if we can view ourneighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than wecan our own, then the actions of their Friends who are good men arepleasurable to the good; inasmuch as they have both the requisites whichare naturally pleasant. So the man in the highest state of happinesswill need Friends of this kind, since he desires to contemplate goodactions, and actions of his own, which those of his friend, being a goodman, are. Again, common opinion requires that the Happy man live withpleasure to himself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, forit is not easy to work continuously by one's self, but in company with,and in regard to others, it is easier, and therefore the working, beingpleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should bein respect of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good takespleasure in the actions which accord with Virtue and is annoyed at thosewhich spring from Vice, just as a musical man is pleased with beautifulmusic and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says, Virtue itselfmay be improved by practice, from living with the good.
And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it willprobably appear that the good friend is naturally choiceworthy to thegood man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is alsoin itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of living, sofar as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by the powerof sentience, in man it is characterised by that of sentience, orof rationality (the faculty of course being referred to the actualoperation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the actualoperation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the act ofsentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in itselfone of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a definitetotality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good), but whatis naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it seemsto be pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life which isdepraved and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which is such isindefinite as are its inherent qualities: however, what is to be said ofpain will be clearer in what is to follow.)
If then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and thisappears from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who aregood and in high happiness; their course of life being most choiceworthyand their existence most choiceworthy likewise), then also he that seesperceives that he sees; and he that hears perceives that he hears; andhe that walks perceives that he walks; and in all the other instancesin like manner there is a faculty which reflects upon and perceives thefact that we are working, so that we can perceive that we perceive andintellectually know that we intellectually know: but to perceive that weperceive or that we intellectually know is to perceive that we exist,since existence was defined to be perceiving or intellectually knowing.[Sidenote: 1170b Now to perceive that one lives is a thing pleasantin itself, life being a thing naturally good, and the perceiving of thepresence in ourselves of things naturally good being pleasant.]
Therefore the fact of living is choiceworthy, and to the good speciallyso since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they receivepleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in itself isgood.
But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a namefor a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choiceworthy toeach so too, or similarly at least, is his friend's existence. But theground of one's own existence being choiceworthy is the perceiving ofone's self being good, any such perception being in itself pleasant.Therefore one ought to be thoroughly conscious of one's friend'sexistence, which will result from living with him, that is sharing inhis words and thoughts: for this is the meaning of the term as appliedto the human species, not mere feeding together as in the case ofbrutes.
If then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itselfchoiceworthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend'sexistence, then the friend also must be among things choiceworthy. Butwhatever is choiceworthy to a man he should have or else he will be inthis point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion"Happy" will need good Friends. Are we then to make our friends asnumerous as possible? or, as in respect of acquaintance it is thoughtto have been well said "have not thou many acquaintances yet be notwithout;" so too in respect of Friendship may we adopt the precept, andsay that a man should not be without friends, nor again have exceedingmany friends?
Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quotedwill, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the servicesof many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be long enoughto do this for them. So that, if more numerous than what will sufficefor one's own life, they become officious, and are hindrances in respectof living well: and so we do not want them. And again of those who areto be for pleasure a few are quite enough, just like sweetening in ourfood.
X
But of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is thereany measure of the number of friends, as there is of the number toconstitute a Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of tenmen, and if you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is notany longer a Community. However, the number is not perhaps some onedefinite number but any between certain extreme limits.
[Sidenote: 1171a] Well, of friends likewise there is a limited number,which perhaps may be laid down to be the greatest number with whom itwould be possible to keep up intimacy; this being thought to be one ofthe greatest marks of Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it isnot possible to be intimate with many, in other words, to part one'sself among many. And besides it must be remembered that they also are tobe friends to one another if they are all to live together: but it is amatter of difficulty to find this in many men at once.
It comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one's self the joysand sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have tosympathise at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows ofthat other.
Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends butso many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem notto be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and,for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the sametime: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but oneobject: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towardswhom they are felt.
And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a timebecome friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendshipsof the kind are between two persons: whereas they who have manyfriends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to befriends really to no one except in the way of general society; I meanthe characters denominated as over-complaisant.
To be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to manywithout being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: butone cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for thepersons' own sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find evena few such.
XI
Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they arerequired, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help andthe prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to: forthey have a desire to act kindly to some one.
To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in thiscase useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is morehonourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends, itbeing preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For thevery presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men whengrieved are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.
And from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it isthat they do in a manner take part of the weight of calamities, or onlythat their presence, being pleasurable, and the consciousness of theirsympathy, make the pain of the sufferer less. However, we will notfurther discuss whether these which have been suggested or some othercauses produce the relief, at least the effect we speak of is a matterof plain fact.
[Sidenote: 1171b] But their presence has probably a mixed effect: Imean, not only is the very seeing friends pleasant, especially to one inmisfortune, and actual help towards lessening the grief is afforded(the natural tendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, beingto comfort by look and word, because he is well acquainted with thesufferer's temper and disposition and therefore knows what things givehim pleasure and pain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grievedat his misfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoidsbeing cause of pain to his friends. And for this reason they who areof a manly nature are cautious not to implicate their friends in theirpain; and unless a man is exceedingly callous to the pain of others hecannot bear the pain which is thus caused to his friends: in short, hedoes not admit men to wail with him, not being given to wail at all:women, it is true, and men who resemble women, like to have others togroan with them, and love such as friends and sympathisers. But itis plain that it is our duty in all things to imitate the highestcharacter.
On the other hand, the advantages of friends in our prosperity are thepleasurable intercourse and the consciousness that they are pleased atour good fortune.
It would seem, therefore, that we ought to call in friends readily onoccasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good toothers: but on occasion of bad fortune, we should do so with reluctance;for we should as little as possible make others share in our ills; onwhich principle goes the saying, "I am unfortunate, let that suffice."The most proper occasion for calling them in is when with small troubleor annoyance to themselves they can be of very great use to the personwho needs them.
But, on the contrary, it is fitting perhaps to go to one's friends intheir misfortunes unasked and with alacrity (because kindness is thefriend's office and specially towards those who are in need and who donot demand it as a right, this being more creditable and more pleasantto both); and on occasion of their good fortune to go readily, if wecan forward it in any way (because men need their friends for thislikewise), but to be backward in sharing it, any great eagerness toreceive advantage not being creditable.
One should perhaps be cautious not to present the appearance ofsullenness in declining the sympathy or help of friends, for thishappens occasionally.
It appears then that the presence of friends is, under allcircumstances, choiceworthy.
May we not say then that, as seeing the beloved object is most prized bylovers and they choose this sense rather than any of the others becauseLove
"Is engendered in the eyes, With gazing fed,"
in like manner intimacy is to friends most choiceworthy, Friendshipbeing communion? Again, as a man is to himself so is he to his friend;now with respect to himself the perception of his own existence ischoiceworthy, therefore is it also in respect of his friend.
And besides, their Friendship is acted out in intimacy, and so with goodreason they desire this. And whatever in each man's opinion constitutesexistence, or whatsoever it is for the sake of which they choose life,herein they wish their friends to join with them; and so some men drinktogether, others gamble, others join in gymnastic exercises or hunting,others study philosophy together: in each case spending their daystogether in that which they like best of all things in life, for sincethey wish to be intimate with their friends they do and partake in thosethings whereby they think to attain this object.
Therefore the Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, beingunstable, they share in what is bad and become depraved in being madelike to one another: but the Friendship of the good is good, growingwith their intercourse; they improve also, as it seems, by repeatedacts, and by mutual correction, for they receive impress from oneanother in the points which give them pleasure; whence says the poet,
"Thou from the good, good things shalt surely learn."
Here then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thingis to go into the subject of Pleasure.