Next, it would seem, follows a discussion respecting Pleasure, for it isthought to be most closely bound up with our kind: and so men train theyoung, guiding them on their course by the rudders of Pleasure and Pain.And to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most importantfor the formation of good moral character: because these feelings extendall one's life through, giving a bias towards and exerting an influenceon the side of Virtue and Happiness, since men choose what is pleasantand avoid what is painful.
Subjects such as these then, it would seem, we ought by no means to passby, and specially since they involve much difference of opinion. Thereare those who call Pleasure the Chief Good; there are others who on thecontrary maintain that it is exceedingly bad; some perhaps from a realconviction that such is the case, others from a notion that it isbetter, in reference to our life and conduct, to show up Pleasure asbad, even if it is not so really; arguing that, as the mass of men havea bias towards it and are the slaves of their pleasures, it is right todraw them to the contrary, for that so they may possibly arrive at themean.
I confess I suspect the soundness of this policy; in matters respectingmen's feelings and actions theories are less convincing than facts:whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience,they not only are despised but involve the truth in their fall: he, forinstance, who deprecates Pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets thecredit of backsliding to it as being universally such as he said it was,the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions.
Real accounts, therefore, of such matters seem to be most expedient, notwith a view to knowledge merely but to life and conduct: for they arebelieved as being in harm with facts, and so they prevail with the wiseto live in accordance with them.
But of such considerations enough: let us now proceed to the currentmaxims respecting Pleasure.
II Now Eudoxus thought Pleasure to be the Chief Good because he saw all,rational and irrational alike, aiming at it: and he argued that, sincein all what was the object of choice must be good and what most so thebest, the fact of all being drawn to the same thing proved this thing tobe the best for all: "For each," he said, "finds what is good for itselfjust as it does its proper nourishment, and so that which is good forall, and the object of the aim of all, is their Chief Good."
(And his theories were received, not so much for their own sake, asbecause of his excellent moral character; for he was thought to beeminently possessed of perfect self-mastery, and therefore it was notthought that he said these things because he was a lover of Pleasure butthat he really was so convinced.)
And he thought his position was not less proved by the argument from thecontrary: that is, since Pain was in itself an object of avoidance toall the contrary must be in like manner an object of choice.
Again he urged that that is most choiceworthy which we choose, not byreason of, or with a view to, anything further; and that Pleasure isconfessedly of this kind because no one ever goes on to ask to whatpurpose he is pleased, feeling that Pleasure is in itself choiceworthy.
Again, that when added to any other good it makes it more choiceworthy;as, for instance, to actions of justice, or perfected self-mastery; andgood can only be increased by itself.
However, this argument at least seems to prove only that it belongs tothe class of goods, and not that it does so more than anything else: forevery good is more choicewortby in combination with some other than whentaken quite alone. In fact, it is by just such an argument that Platoproves that Pleasure is not the Chief Good: "For," says he, "the life ofPleasure is more choiceworthy in combination with Practical Wisdom thanapart from it; but, if the compound better then simple Pleasure cannotbe the Chief Good; because the very Chief Good cannot by any additionbecome choiceworthy than it is already:" and it is obvious that nothingelse can be the Chief Good, which by combination with any of the thingsin themselves good comes to be more choiceworthy.
What is there then of such a nature? (meaning, of course, whereof we canpartake; because that which we are in search of must be such).
As for those who object that "what all aim at is not necessarily good,"I confess I cannot see much in what they say, because what all thinkwe say is. And he who would cut away this ground from under us willnot bring forward things more dependable: because if the argument hadrested on the desires of irrational creatures there might have beensomething in what he says, but, since the rational also desire Pleasure,how can his objection be allowed any weight? and it may be that, even inthe lower animals, there is some natural good principle above themselveswhich aims at the good peculiar to them.
Nor does that seem to be sound which is urged respecting the argumentfrom the contrary: I mean, some people say "it does not follow thatPleasure must be good because Pain is evil, since evil may be opposed toevil, and both evil and good to what is indifferent:" now what they sayis right enough in itself but does not hold in the present instance.If both Pleasure and Pain were bad both would have been objects ofavoidance; or if neither then neither would have been, at all eventsthey must have fared alike: but now men do plainly avoid the one as badand choose the other as good, and so there is a complete opposition. IIINor again is Pleasure therefore excluded from being good because itdoes not belong to the class of qualities: the acts of virtue are notqualities, neither is Happiness [yet surely both are goods].
Again, they say the Chief Good is limited but Pleasure unlimited, inthat it admits of degrees.
Now if they judge this from the act of feeling Pleasure then the samething will apply to justice and all the other virtues, in respect ofwhich clearly it is said that men are more or less of such and suchcharacters (according to the different virtues), they are more just ormore brave, or one may practise justice and self-mastery more or less.
If, on the other hand, they judge in respect of the Pleasures themselvesthen it may be they miss the true cause, namely that some are unmixedand others mixed: for just as health being in itself limited, admits ofdegrees, why should not Pleasure do so and yet be limited? in the formercase we account for it by the fact that there is not the same adjustmentof parts in all men, nor one and the same always in the same individual:but health, though relaxed, remains up to a certain point, and differsin degrees; and of course the same may be the case with Pleasure.
Again, assuming the Chief Good to be perfect and all Movements andGenerations imperfect, they try to shew that Pleasure is a Movement anda Generation.
Yet they do not seem warranted in saying even that it is a Movement: forto every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, andif not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but toPleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quicklyinto the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in thestate quickly, nor relatively to the state of any other person; but wecan walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.
Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly orslowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the perceptionof Pleasure) quickly, is not possible. And how can it be a Generation?because, according to notions generally held, not anything isgenerated from anything, but a thing resolves itself into that outof which it was generated: whereas of that of which Pleasure is aGeneration Pain is a Destruction.
Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature andPleasure a supply of it.
But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is asupplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure inwhich the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet thisis not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only aperson of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as hewill be pained when he is cut.
This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasuresconnected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt alack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with thesupply of their lack.
But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant onmathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; andof such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense ofSmell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: nowof what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack ofanything to be afterwards supplied.
And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply thatthese are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow becausethey are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they arepleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those thingsare really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick,or those objects really white which give that impression to peoplelabouring under ophthalmia.
Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choiceworthy but not asderived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price oftreason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything howeverloathsome. Or again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? thosederived from honourable objects, for instance are different from thosearising from disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experiencethe Pleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical manwithout being musical; and so on of others.
The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flattererwould seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or thatthere are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to havegood as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only; andthis last is reproached, but the former men praise as having differentobjects in his intercourse.
[Sidenote: 1174a]
Again, no one would choose to live with a child's intellect all hislife through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from suchobjects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any ofthe most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.
There are many things also about which we should be diligent even thoughthey brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing, possessingthe various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do follow on thesenaturally makes no difference, because we should certainly choose themeven though no Pleasure resulted from them.
It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor isevery kind of it choiceworthy: and that there are some choiceworthy inthemselves, differing in kind, i.e. in the sources from which theyare derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the currentmaxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.
[Sidenote: IV]
Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take upthe subject afresh.
An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say,it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete itswhole nature.
Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say;and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose wholenature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for thisreason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time ofcertain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance, theMovement of house-building is then only complete when the builder hasproduced what he intended, that is, either in the whole time [necessaryto complete the whole design], or in a given portion. But all thesubordinate Movements are incomplete in the parts of the time, and aredifferent in kind from the whole movement and from one another (Imean, for instance, that the fitting the stones together is a Movementdifferent from that of fluting the column, and both again from theconstruction of the Temple as a whole: but this last is complete aslacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas that of the basement,or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each is a Movement of a partmerely).
As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time youchoose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, inthe whole time requisite.
[Sidenote: 1174b]
And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if motionbe a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too there aredifferent kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And not onlyso, but there are different kinds even in walking: the where-from andwhere-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a portion of it;nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this line the same ascrossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a line but a line ina given place, and this is in a different place from that.
Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will nowtherefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given moment;and that most movements are incomplete and specifically different, sincethe whence and whither constitute different species.
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: itis plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from oneanother, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole andcomplete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of movingexcept in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to thesensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is akind of "whole."
From these considerations then it is plain that people are not warrantedin saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation: because theseterms are not applicable to all things, only to such as are divisibleand not "wholes:" I mean that of an act of Sight there is no Generation,nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one of these aMovement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there Movement orGeneration, because it is, as one may say, "a whole."
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering toit, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent ofthe Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be muchwhat I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying"the Faculty" works, instead of, "that subject wherein the Facultyresides"), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in itsbest state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this willbe, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendantupon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every intellectualoperation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is mostperfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best Facultyupon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.
And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it inthe same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good;just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of ahealthy state.
And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every PercipientFaculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds arepleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when theFaculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when boththe Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will alwaysexist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
[Sidenote: 1175a]
Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of aninherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in peopleat their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual orsensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty whichdiscerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working:because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and thatwhich is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same resultfollows naturally.
How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not thathe wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermittingexertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, becausethat follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things whichplease when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly thesame reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these Objectswith its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing stedfastlyat anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the kind it wasat first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because allaim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man worksat and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, forinstance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with hisintellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfectsthe acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder thenthat they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, whichis itself choiceworthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whetherwe choose Life for Pleasure's sake of Pleasure for Life's sake; becausethese two plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation;since Pleasure comes not into being without Working, and again, everyWorking Pleasure perfects.)
And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected bythings so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions ofNature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, andhouses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts ofWorking which are different in kind are perfected by things differing inkind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from those of theSenses, and these last from one another; therefore so do the Pleasureswhich perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting betweeneach Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that thePleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they whowork with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to agreater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricianswho take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points morecompletely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or architecture,or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit, because they feelPleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, andthings which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which areproper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves alsospecifically different.
Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the Pleasuresarising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for instance,people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their attention toconversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a flute; becausethey take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the Working they areat the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure attendant onflute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or discourse. Muchthe same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person isengaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, thepleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the disparityin pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even ceasesaltogether to work at the other.
This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anythingwhatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderatelypleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people,for instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when theperformance is indifferent.
Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to theWorkings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, whilethose Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain thereis a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to anyWorking have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it,which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikeswriting, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other doesnot calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with somePain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by thePleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which ariseupon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances.As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already thatthey produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is theydestroy the Working, only not in like way.
Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness,some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others intheir nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its ownproper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a goodWorking is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires forwhat is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.
Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closelyconnected with them even than the desires after them: for these lastare separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to theWorkings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whetherthe Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seemto be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, becausethat is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the samefrom not being separated from these.
As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sightdiffers from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste;therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, IntellectualPleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both ofIntellectual and Sensual from one another.
It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper toitself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which isattendant on the Working. And the soundness of this will appear uponparticular inspection: for horse, dog, and man have different Pleasures;as Heraclitus says, an ass would sooner have hay than gold; in otherwords, provender is pleasanter to asses than gold. So then the Pleasuresof animals specifically different are also specifically different, butthose of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are without difference.
Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for thevery same things please some and pain others: and what are painful andhateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is thecase with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a feveras to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person inrobust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case withother things also.
Now in all such cases that is held to be which impresses the good manwith the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim(as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, inthat he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be realPleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those thingspleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing thatwhat are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression ofbeing pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings; andthe things in question are not pleasant really, only to these particularpersons, and to them only as being thus disposed.
Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert thosewhich are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except todepraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind,or which, must we say is The Pleasure of Man? is not the answer plainfrom considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?
Whether then there be one or several Workings which belong to theperfect and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings mustbe said to be specially and properly The Pleasures of Man; and allthe rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as theWorkings are related to those highest and best ones.
VI
Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, andFriendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch outHappiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things:and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was statedbefore.
[Sidenote: 1176b] Well then, we said that it is not a State merely;because, if it were, it might belong to one who slept all his lifethrough and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very greatcalamities: and so, if these possibilities displease us and we wouldrather put it into the rank of some kind of Working (as was also saidbefore), and Workings are of different kinds (some being necessaryand choiceworthy with a view to other things, while others are so inthemselves), it is plain we must rank Happiness among those choiceworthyfor their own sakes and not among those which are so with a view tosomething further: because Happiness has no lack of anything but isself-sufficient.
By choiceworthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing issought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be theactions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellentis one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone.
And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not choosethem with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm thanprofit from them, neglecting their persons and their property. Still thecommon run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such pastimes,which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such are highlyesteemed among despots; because they make themselves pleasant in thosethings which these aim at, and these accordingly want such men.
Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness becausemen in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannotargue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue norIntellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are theonly sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because thesemen, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge inbodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choiceworthy:for children too believe that those things are most excellent which areprecious in their eyes.
We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as towhat is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we havemany times said, those things are really precious and pleasant whichseem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working is mostchoiceworthy which is in accordance with his own state to the good manthat is so which is in accordance with Virtue.
Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion isabsurd of the End being amusement, and of one's toiling and enduringhardness all one's life long with a view to amusement: for everything inthe world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view, exceptHappiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to takepains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish andvery childish: but to amuse one's self with a view to steady employmentafterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for amusement islike rest, and men want rest because unable to labour continuously.
Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view toWorking afterwards.
[Sidenote: 1177a] Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one inthe way of Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness and standsnot in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, wesay, are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement:and we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, ismore earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and morecapable of Happiness.
Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or evena slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living butHappiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it isimplied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but inthe Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.
VII
Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course thatExcellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of thebest Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or someother which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive ofnoble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or themost divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this inaccordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness.
That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem tobe consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the firstplace, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect is thehighest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which itis conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of ourknowledge.
Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplatethan to do anything else whatever, continuously.
Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in Happiness,and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in the way ofScience is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit of Science isthought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and itis reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to thosewho have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking for, it.
And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly tothe Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life areneeded alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the othercharacters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, thejust man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, topractise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfectedself-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the manof science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and themore entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he iscertainly most Self-Sufficient.
[Sidenote: 1177b] Again, this alone would seem to be rested in forits own sake, since nothing results from it beyond the fact of havingcontemplated; whereas from all things which are objects of moral actionwe do mean to get something beside the doing them, be the same more orless.
Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest; for we toil that wemay rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the Practical Virtuesrequire either society or war for their Working, and the actionsregarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely,because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war's sake: hewould indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemiesof his friends to secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. TheWorking also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, beside theactual work of government, seeks for power and dignities or at leastHappiness for the man himself and his fellow-citizens: a Happinessdistinct the national Happiness which we evidently seek as beingdifferent and distinct.
If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues thoseof policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these arerestless, and aim at some further End and are not choiceworthy fortheir own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt forcontemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no Endbeyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increasethe Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity ofrest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmityof human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, ifattaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added becausenone of the points of Happiness is incomplete.
But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a manwill live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is inhim a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excelshis composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that inaccordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pureIntellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will thelife in accordance with it be divine compared with man's ordinary life.[Sidenote: 1178a] Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as manto mind only man's affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so faras we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view toliving in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as itmay be in bulk yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all theothers.
In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man's "Self," sinceit is supreme and above all others in goodness it would be absurd thenfor a man not to choose his own life but that of some other.
And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is properto each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Manthe life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is mosttruly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.
VIII
And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is inaccordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings inaccordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions ofjustice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, incontracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions andfeelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all theseplainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moralcharacter is thought to result in some points from physicalcircumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with thepassions.
Again, Practical Wisdom and Excellence of the Moral character arevery closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are inaccordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accordwith Practical Wisdom.
These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to thecomposite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite natureare proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and Happiness whichis in accordance with them. But that of the Pure Intellect is separateand distinct: and let this suffice upon the subject, since greatexactness is beyond our purpose,
It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a smalldegree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far asnecessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters toneed them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives insociety does take more pains about his person and all that kind ofthing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come toconsider their Workings there will be found a great difference.
I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentionsare uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence ofwishing to do justly), and the brave man must have power, ifhe is to perform any of the actions which appertain to his particularVirtue, and the man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity oftemptation, else how shall he or any of the others display his realcharacter?
[Sidenote: 1178b]
(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice orthe actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both: itis plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but forthe actions many things are required, and the greater and more numerousthey are the more.) But as for the man engaged in ContemplativeSpeculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his Working, but,so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the Contemplation atleast; because of course in so far as he is Man and lives in society hechooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will need such thingsfor maintaining his character as Man though not as a speculativephilosopher.
And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Workingmay appear also from the following consideration: our conception of thegods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind ofMoral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay,will they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as formingcontracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall wepicture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear andmeeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but towhom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they havemoney or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfectedself-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praisethat they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subjectinto all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actionswould appear trivial and unworthy of gods.
Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that theyWork because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away likeEndymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still moreif Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working ofthe Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for ContemplativeSpeculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatestcapacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.
A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animalsdo not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any suchWorking.
To the gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far asthere is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals noneis happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.
Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, andin proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have theyalso the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of ContemplativeSpeculation because it is in itself precious.
So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since itis Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, butthere must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of allkinds.
[Sidenote: 1179a] However, it must not be thought, because withoutexternal goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore hewill require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neitherSelf-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possibleto act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since even withmoderate means a man may act in accordance with Virtue.
And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thoughtto act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even more: itwill be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man as isnecessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance withVirtue.
Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that theyare men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achievedthe most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfectself-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to actas they ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as eitherrich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounteda strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge byoutward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.
And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our accountof the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, inmatters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life,for herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine thepreceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, andwhen they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are atvariance with them conceive of them as mere theories.
Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, PureIntellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame ofmind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care isbestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to thinkthat they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (andthis must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite with kindnessthose who love and honour this most, as paying observance to what isdear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is quite obviousthat the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is thereforedearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the same time mostHappy.
Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.
IX
Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of wayon these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship andPleasure; are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Mustwe not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters ofmoral action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End butrather Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue isKnowledge enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and takewhatever other means there are of becoming good.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make mengood, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous andgreat rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but inpoint of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulatethe generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principleany noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly arepowerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it isnot their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear;nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to doit but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they liveat the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasuresand the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains; butas for what is noble and truly pleasurable they have not an idea of it,inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.
Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it iseither actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter bywords what has been of old taken into men's very dispositions: and,it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means andappliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some toCustom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature's part, be it what it may,obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truestsense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,
Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not availwith all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to havebeen previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought; just asthe soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in obedienceto passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if heheard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform? in fact,generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to brute force.So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity to Virtue inthe disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable and loathwhat is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue from theearliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws of suchkind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not pleasant tothe mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this reason thefood, and manner of living generally, ought to be the subject oflegal regulation, because things when become habitual will not bedisagreeable.
[Sidenote: 1180a] Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men whileyoung should get right food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they willhave to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after theyhave attained to man's estate, we shall want laws on these points aswell, and, in fine, respecting one's whole life, since the mass of menare amenable to compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment ratherthan to a sense of honour.
And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the senseof honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion that theywill then obey who have been well trained in habits; they shouldimpose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are of lesspromising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the good manand he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason;and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in check, likebeasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the pains shouldbe such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are liked.
As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought upand habituated well, and then live accordingly under good institutions,and never do what is low and mean, either against or with his will. Nowthese objects can be attained only by men living in accordance with someguiding Intellect and right order, with power to back them.
As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsorypower, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king orsome one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is adeclaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And peoplefeel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, howeverrightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object ofhatred, though enforcing right rules.
The Laced鎚onian is nearly the only State in which the framer of theConstitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the foodand manner of living of the people: in most States these points areentirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wifeand children Cyclops-Fashion.
Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right PublicSystem and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as apublic matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to devolveupon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with his ownchildren and friends, or at least to make this his aim and purpose: andthis, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be best able to doby making a Legislator of himself: since all public *[Sidenote: 1180b]systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws andthose are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they arewritten or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one ormany, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not inmusic, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are gainedby practice.
For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in familiesthe express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in thelatter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and arenaturally obedient to the authority which controls them.
Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as inthe case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man whois in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.
It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended tounder Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain whatis expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, orgymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the betterfor being acquainted with general rules; as, "that so and so is good forall, or for men in such and such cases:" because general maxims are notonly said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this is noreason against the possibility of a man's taking excellent care ofsome one case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but fromexperience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point; justas some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they wouldbe wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem to benecessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real artist andwell acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have recourseto general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for we havealready stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.
If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentalityof laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of careand training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treatskilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what anyordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in thehealing art, and all others which involve careful practice and skill.
[Sidenote: 1181a] Will not then our next business be to inquire fromwhat sources, or how one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; orshall we say, that, as in similar cases, Statesmen are the people tolearn from, since this faculty was thought to be a part of the SocialScience? Must we not admit that the Political Science plainly does notstand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and faculties? Imean, that while in all other cases those who impart the facultiesand themselves exert them are identical (physicians and painters forinstance) matters of Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, butnot one of them practises it, that being left to those actually engagedin it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by somesingular knack and by mere practice rather than by any intellectualprocess: for they neither write nor speak on these matters (though itmight be more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts orthe assembly), nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons ortheir friends.
One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to theircommunities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or theirdearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.
Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition;merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have madeStatesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who wouldacquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.
But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long wayoff from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its natureand objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the samefooting with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they haveconceived it to be "an easy matter to legislate by simply collectingsuch laws as are famous because of course one could select the best," asthough the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging arighta very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have practicalknowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or understandwith what means and in what way they are accomplished, and whatharmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being able todiscover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.
[Sidenote: 1181b] Now laws may be called the performances or tangibleresults of Political Science; how then can a man acquire from thesethe faculty of Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men madephysicians by compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour togive not only the cases but also how they may be cured, and the propertreatment in each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, theseare thought to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessionaluseless. In like manner it may be that collections of laws andConstitutions would be exceedingly useful to such as are able tospeculate on them, and judge what is well, and what ill, and whatkind of things fit in with what others: but they who without thisqualification should go through such matters cannot have right judgment,unless they have it by instinct, though they may become more intelligentin such matters.
Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated thesubject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigateit ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus whatwe may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there maybe in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities wehave collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroyCommunities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why someare well and others ill managed, for after such inquiry, we shall be thebetter able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of Constitutionis best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and what laws andcustoms.
To this let us now proceed.
THE END.
* * * * * * * * * * * *