P 2, l. 16. For this term, as here employed, our language contains noequivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (inwhich it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication "Thescience of Society," and this includes everything which can bear atall upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, "Quicquid agunthomines nostri est farrago libelli." It is in this view that it isfairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.
The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is "MoralPhilosophy." Aristotle explains the term in this sense in theRhetoric (1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion estiprosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatisethe moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science ofSociety which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to thelarger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the buildingof the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of thefield. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts ofa [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest andmost complete development.
The third sense is "The detail of Civil Government," which Aristotleexpressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
P 3, l. 23. Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to somedefinite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is thebest judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, inthe latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured byeducation. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best andwisest man of one's acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in adifficult case of conduct.
Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
P 3, l. 35. In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it issaid of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable,but indiscriminate in its objects, [Greek: pantachothen].
P 4, l. 30. [Greek: 'Archae] is a word used in this treatise in varioussignifications. The primary one is "beginning or first cause," and thisruns through all its various uses.
"Rule," and sometimes "Rulers," are denoted by this term the initiativebeing a property of Rule.
"Principle" is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the mostcharacteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means "starting-point."Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve ([Greek: ou eneka]), andthat of Action ([Greek: othen ae kenaesis]). I desire praise of men thisthen is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to beattained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginningof Action.
The beginnings of Resolve, '[Greek: Archai] or Motives, when formallystated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the [Greek:sullagismoi ton prakton], i.e. the reasoning into which actions may beanalysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of thePharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done; Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise: [ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, andthis is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
P. 5, l 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining thesignification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorimaaplos]
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, asdenoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truthis [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which weindividually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:gnorima aemin] which we have received as true. From this appearsimmediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the studyof Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either workprinciples into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soonas they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do.The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard thefifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and thefirst time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and rightthe principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is aslittle inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if heshould ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are sodenominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existedbefore the instances of their operation. Justice must have existedbefore just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meetwith are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles andlaws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assumeprinciples, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says,"We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denoteseither particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin withparticulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training inhabits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for afact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there willbe no want of the reason for the fact in addition"
The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of "principles."
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
P 6, l. 1. Or "prove themselves good," as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supportedby a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d' upo ton epieikon kaieidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai periauton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legontonkrisei]
P 6, l. 11. [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statementby any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come tomean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
P 6, l. 13. A lost work, supposed to have been so called, becausecontaining miscellaneous questions.
P 6, l. 15. It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotlerefers to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highesthappiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man thereason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, thatis the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria]cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the first, menwould have been for making the experiment at once, without the troubleof self-discipline.
P 6, l. 22. Or, as some think, "many theories have been founded onthem."
P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus--
[Greek: to peras to apeiron | to euthu to perisson to artion | to phos to en to plethos | to tetragonon to dexion to aristeron | to aeremoun to arren to thelu | to agathon ]
P 8, l. 2. Plato's sister's son.
P 9, l. 9. This is the capital defect in Aristotle's eyes, who beingeminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did notnecessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it byenabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a wayof stating facts, and leads to no action.
P. 10, l. 34. i.e. the identification of Happiness with the ChiefGood.
P. 11, l. 11. i.e. without the capability of addition.
P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be theChief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to theChief Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo oudentagathon an eiae o meta tenos ton kath' auto agathon airetoteronginetai.]
P. 12, l. 9. i.e. as working or as quiescent.
P. 13, 1. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moralsenses. "Fire burns," is an instance of the former, "Treason is odious,"of the latter.
P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation ofthis word, because though "habitus" may be equivalent to all the sensesof [Greek: exis], "habit" is not, at least according to our colloquialusage we commonly denote by "habit" a state formed by habituation.
P. 14, l. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering thispassage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let themdepend grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered,however, that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-knownmeaning also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the pointof the passage seems more completely brought out.
P. 15 l. 16. "Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affectionto goodness." (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasurein the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty ofperception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure beingas truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness thenimplies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its objectpresent, and pleasure continually result.
P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact thatexternal circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happinessnot that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it tobe identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to havea fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what heconsiders an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a directgift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive toself-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows thereforethat it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it tocome partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with otherreasons why we should think with him.
P. 16, l. 26. This term is important, what has been maimed was onceperfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man beingborn incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.
P. 17, l. 3. But why give materials and instruments, if there is no workto do?
P. 18, l. 6. The supposed pair of ancestors.
P. 18, l. 12. Solon says, "Call no man happy till he is dead." He mustmean either, The man when dead is happy (a), or, The man when deadmay be said to have been happy (b). If the former, does he meanpositive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness ([Greek: B])?We cannot allow (a), Men's opinions disallow ([Greek: B]), We revertnow to the consideration of (b).
P. 18, l. 36. The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notioncommonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceivethat Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune ischangeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because wehave therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
P. 20, l. 12. The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, ofcourse, dressed his actors for their parts; not according to theirfancies or his own.
Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirableparaphrase on this.
"Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken byproportion with that which every man's estate in this present liferequireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contentethwise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work,rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing thenthe actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for menof calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior conditionmany things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they areblessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what theirstation and place asketh, though they have no more."
P. 20, l. 18. Always bearing in mind that man "never continueth in onestay."
P. 20, l. 11. The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, mustbe in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this willbe true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends:and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to beliable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair topresume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.
P. 21, l. 18. This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, whichare either so in esse or in posse.
If in esse, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Thosein posse, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. ThusRhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused tosupport villainy. Money in like way.
P. 22, l. 4. Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwardsadopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies inthe Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.
P. 22, l. 13. See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
P. 24, l. 23. The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
P. 24, l. 29. The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are hereused in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is hewho has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough tokeep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantlyprevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.
By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a statein which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek:sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law theremonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till theyare silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and theman in it [Greek: akolastos].
P. 25, l. 2. This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek:echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person's [Greek:logos] for one's own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-controlor perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its ownimpulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematicaltruths as part of the mental furniture, i.e. knowing them.
P 25, l. 16. [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian],and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral andIntellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having thelatter, but only for exerting and using the former.
P. 26, l. 2. Which we call simply virtue.
P. 26, l. 4. For nature must of course supply the capacity.
P. 26, l. 18. Or "as a simple result of nature."
P. 28, l. 12. This is done in the Sixth Book.
P. 28, l. 21. It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particulardetails of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rulecan be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler'sSermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. P. 29, l.32. The words [Greek: akolastos] and [Greek: deilos] are not used herein their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice the[Greek: enkrates] necessarily feels pain, because he must always bethwarting passions which are a real part of his nature, though this painwill grow less and less as he nears the point of [Greek: sophrosyne] orperfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then, andthen only, cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary tothe formation of true courage. All that is meant here is, that nohabit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until painaltogether vanishes.
P. 30, l. 18. Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the partsof our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and assuch have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at theirextirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will berare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being thelegitimate result of the law that "passive impressions weaken as activehabits are strengthened, by repetition." If musical instruments aremaking discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony ineither case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positiveenjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out,Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I knownot), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it tofall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might trulysay, Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. See on this point BishopButler's fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Disciplinein the first part of his Analogy.
P. 32, l. 16. I have adopted this word from our old writers, because ourword act is so commonly interchanged with action. [Greek: Praxis](action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to theperformance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may beright when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killedby his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be good though the[Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions doeswhat would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject ofcourse to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error),but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] right. Norepetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butleron the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above,sect. 11. "And in like manner as habits belonging to the body," etc.
P. 32, l. 32. Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue,Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
P. 33, l. 15. That is, not for merely having them, because we did notmake ourselves.
See Bishop Butler's account of our nature as containing "particularpropensions," in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and inthe Preface to the Sermons. P. 34, l. 14. This refers to the division ofquantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are calledby Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to oneanother, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose partshave no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of wordsgrammatically unconnected.
P. 34, l. 27. Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usuallycalled progression), when they increase or decrease by a commondifference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 4 = 6, 6 4= 10, or viceversa, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.
P. 36, l. 3. The two are necessary, because since the reason itself maybe perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we maysuppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide,but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must goout of himself for direction.
P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to implythat this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a viva vocelecture than a set formal treatise. "The table" of virtues and vicesprobably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
P. 37,1. 23. Afterwards defined as "All things whose value is measuredby money"
P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustratedby Horace's use of the term hiatus:
[Sidenote: A P 138] "Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?"Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come,if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] orfruitless and unmeaning hiatus; the transference to the presentsubject is easy.
P. 38, l. 22. In like manner we talk of laudable ambition, implying ofcourse there may be that which is not laudable.
P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler's, which corresponds exactlyto the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things mustbe generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton ento auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
P. 42, l. 22. "[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb," says the Scholiaston the Phaedo, "used of those who do anything safely and cautiouslyinasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set aboutthen: preparations for the second cautiously," and he then alludes tothis passage.
P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the recoil."Naturam expellasfurca tamen usque recurret."
P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrinesentertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regardingpleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helencomes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have nodifficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred suchsuffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that shebring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle's relation to Pleasure he does not,with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Pariswould risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it whollyevil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had causedhad "banished all the beauty from her cheek," but, with the agedcounsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousnessresolves to deny himself, he "feels her sweetness, yet defies herthrall."
P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an analogous noun, todenote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges thesame function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. Itis worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out thesame analogy. We say of a transaction, that it "looks ugly," "soundsoddly," is a "nasty job," "stinks in our nostrils," is a "hard dealing."
P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos],because "particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt,the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratifiedat all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle." But he isresponsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,he "might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more securestate of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following themoral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thuswithstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarilyarose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving hisintegrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, bybeing inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and hissecurity against this lessening danger would increase, since the moralprinciple would gain additional strength by exercise, both which thingsare implied in the notion of virtuous habits." (From the chapteron Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of thisdisquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the thirdchapter of this Book.
P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the MoralGovernment of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it inBishop Butler's manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the twoprinciples in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (SermonII.)
P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness notof the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance ofi.e. incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitutionto have been depraved, i.e. shows Conscience to be perverted, or thesight of Self-love to be impaired.
P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause andeffect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert resultare [Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results frompresent causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, butdesigned causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, orfinal cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be acontradiction in terms to speak of a man's being ignorant of his ownMotive of action.
When the man "drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israelbetween the joints of the harnesss" (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King's death was in fact theresult, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because theKing was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settleddeliberate anger, "It seems in us plainly connected with a sense ofvirtue and vice, of moral good and evil." See the whole Sermon onResentment.
P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here,by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is nofollowing his argument without condescending to the same device, I haveused our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, "What manis he that lusteth to live?"
P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown uponthe person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a prima faciecase. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives thepassage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker's seems tointend al 81 ir/jdis as a separate argument but if so, the argumentwould be a mere petitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell's readingin part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated thelast four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell'sreading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
P. 50, l ii. i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kindis not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits andconstitute character, opinions are in general signs of character, butwhen they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge inMoral Choice.
"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason? When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason."
P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems amere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] addedto [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indicationsthat the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not afinished or systematic one.
P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each ofthe three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made hischoice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an objectof Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and sodistinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the onechosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler's "System of Human Nature," in thePreface to the Sermons.
P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai--bouleusin],contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action.The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz.Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation hasfor its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind,the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definiteextending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, thetwo last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word[Greek: orexis] means literally "a grasping at or after" now as thisphysically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act,consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, anddenotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definitemovement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses arerecognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into[Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, asthe Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptanceand execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the courseto be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceedsto move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of themixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land isnaturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss ofgoods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question beingdebated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to theWill, which causes the owner's hands to throw overboard his goods: theact is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in sodenominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. Ina purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, forno means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequentlythere is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: estid hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otanoiaetho einai agathon)]
P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, becauseit is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot becontrolled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point atwhich gravitation operates irretrievably, "there is a certain bound toimprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains noplace for repentance in the natural course of things." Bishop Butler'sAnalogy, First Part, chap 11.
P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way undercertain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not whatcircumstances we will have to act under.
P. 59, 1. 19. "Moral Courage" is our phrase.
P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed exceptby a paraphrase.
"The object of each separate act of working is that which accords withthe habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts ofbravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accordswith Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (whichimplies that the end and object of it is honour, since things aredenominated according to their end and object), therefore the object ofeach separate act of bravery is honour."
P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation ofdanger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spuriouskinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, "who give strict orders" not toflinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word iscapable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataesaehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparentconfusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. SoLivy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in vanos tumultus gens.
P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel beingbetrayed to some Phocians. "The regulars" were Boeotian troops, the[Greek: politika] Coroneans.
P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixedup two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and thencarried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth whileto imitate.
P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], ashere used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tistodi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kaiaireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].
P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps "things which reflect credit on them" as on page95.
P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.
P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character ofJustice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moralchoice.
P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has twosenses, "to love" and "to kiss," [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I.chap. XIII. 5.
P. 102, 1. 6. Things are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their namein common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] isclose therefore when the difference though real is but slight. Thereis no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], "equivocal" beingapplied to a term and not to its various significates.
P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaenechei kai tagatha k.t.l.]
P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law asconfining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attemptto touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines hisvirtue to his own person.
P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell's text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon],yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violateslaw, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore theunlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular i.e. aswhole to part. There is a reading which also alters the words within theparenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are notnecessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carryout the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty,so therefore pro tanto is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, thathe does the facts of a good man but for the perfection of his ownindividual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightlyin his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also thedistinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler's first Sermon.
P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.
P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:----] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50,etc, by [Greek:----] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say ?000) are tobe divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the realpoint to be settled); then,
A ?B . 400 600.
A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as tomake them commensurable with the respectiy sums).
A 400 : B 600 : : A ?B. This represents the actual distribution; itsfairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
P. 109, 1. 10. i.e. Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtractionfrom the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.
P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty's "Justices."
P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to beout of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it notbeing likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps atliberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that heput them where they made the best sense.
P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do notpretend to be able to get it out of the words.
P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, butnot really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struckwrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, andin the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits twooffences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), andanother against the office.
P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:----] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in agratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindnesson a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of thekindness.
P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder onlyhad (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought tohave. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the mostvaluable, and vice versa.
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:----] at[Greek:----], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that beforeReciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between thewares as between the persons, i.e. the ratio of equality.
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bringinto the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kaiouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must bethe same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artistwill carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.shoes = 1 house.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house--wrong. ----- ----- 100 pr. shoes : 1 house--right ----- ----- 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house--wrong.
P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which isa violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a lessshare, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to thesufferer, of injury.
P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e.numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus themeanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, thatis to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell's reading ([Greek: kineton oumentoi pan]) "but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturallyvariable, but certainly all Just is not such." The sense of the passageis not affected by the reading. In Bekker's text we must take [Greek:kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], i.e. "we admit thereis no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still," etc. WithCardwell's, [Greek: kineton] will mean "which not only does butnaturally may vary."
P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling byenactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of theseheads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an actmaterially unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to theagent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.
P. 121, l. 13. "As distinct from pain or loss." Bishop Butler's Sermonon Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zellas quoted in Cardwell's Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. TheParaphrast gives it as follows:
"But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feelshimself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor],but the other does not."
P. 122, l.18. As when a man is "justified at the Grass Market,"i.e. hung. P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if anyindividual takes more than his share some one else must have less thanhis share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all thiscannot happen.
P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that thelaw views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originallyequal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer theloser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but oneparty.
P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. Hae men gar psuchae tousomatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaenkai despotikaev. Compare also Bishop Butler's account of human natureas a system--of the different authority of certain principles, andspecially the supremacy of Conscience.
P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the processof lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, forinstance, in a building.
P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingentmatter.
P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, incommon language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i e something in hismental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows thebump denoting this aptitude.
P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this,"What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, facultyof Reason." See the description of apetae II. 5.
P. 131, 1. 33. praxis is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in whichReason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must actaccordingly.
The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will isonly moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be alwaysAye or No, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the formercase, and retracted in the later.
So far as what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong,the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute agood Moral Choice, i e.. a good Action, the Reason must have said Ayewhen it ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfectbut wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when thedirection given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move inaccordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery isout of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]--video melioraproboque, Deteriora sequor.
P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truthitself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek:eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek:episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the twomethods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to act([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to make ([Greek: techne]).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. Ifnecessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell's notes.)
P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, whichare to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, i.e.the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife andchildren; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.
P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thushave varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. Thatdifference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis]before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of themind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by thesuggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberatestage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will beforeany Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butlerobserves that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of MoralChoice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our compositenature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselvesdo not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler'sSermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior.Analytics II. 25, defines it to be "the proving the inherence of themajor term in the middle (i.e. proving the truth of the major premissin fig. 1) through the minor term." He presupposes a Syllogism in thefirst Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, ofcourse, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved byInduction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. "Ifof one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which iscoextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated ofthat which is thus coextensive." The fact of this coextensiveness mustbe ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the InductiveFaculty. We will take Aldrich's instance. All Magnets attract iron \ A BC are Magnets | Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. /from an universal.
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductivefaculty)
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved bytaking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)
Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B Cattract iron.
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with theterm A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attractiron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he saysin the same place that for this reason we must conceive ([Greek:noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)as composed of all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances itwould cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of SimpleApprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the stepscut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and againout of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validitydepends entirely upon the quality of the particular mind whichperforms it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark ofGenius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. Itmay be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism whichexhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss literally false.It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction as theterm is used by Aristotle, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I.1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
P 133 1 32. The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it isimpossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without aperusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred torelate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae]draws its conclusions they are to be "true, first principles incapableof any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it,and causes of it." (See the appendix to this Book.)
P 134 1 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that themembra dividentia shall be opposed, i.e. not included the one by theother. P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to bethis: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, justas it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek:phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art,and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so aresomehow connected to prove that connection to be "coextensiveness," wepredicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition,which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specificproperty. See the Topics, 1. vi.
P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which thepopular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek:ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesenhoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]--Luke xvi. 8.
P. 135, l. 5. Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath' ekastapepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.
P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered asclaiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right,and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and ReasonableSelf-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturallysupreme and "Conscience and Self-Love, if we understand our truehappiness, always lead us the same way." Bishop Butler, end of SermonIII.
And again:
"If by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what isupon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with theprinciple of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the ideaitself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to beimproved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause isthere for Moralists to disclaim this principle." From the note onsect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
P. 136, l. 6. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with thefollowing--Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d' exis toommati touto k. t. l]--vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]vii. 9.--[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]--iii. 7 adfinem. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Artdoes not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom.In popular language we use the term "wiser man," as readily as "betterartist" really denoting in each case different degrees of approximationto Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tousepainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
P. 136, l. 17. He would be a better Chymist who should poisonintentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that"Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum." P. 137,l. 13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the OldTestament in the sense first given to [Greek:----] here. "Then wroughtBezaleel and Ahohab, and every wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord putwisdom and understanding to know how to work all manner of work for theservice of the Sanctuary" Exodus xxxvi. i.
P. 137 l. 27. [Greek:----] and [Greek:----], (in the strict sense, for itis used in many different senses in this book) are different parts ofthe whole function [Greek:----], [Greek:----] takes in conclusions, drawnby strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek:----] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining theseprinciples by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek:----] might exist independent of [Greek:----], but not this without that.Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the livingbeing [Greek:----]. There are three branches of [Greek:----] accordingto Greek Philosophy, [Greek:----], [Greek:----], [Greek:----]. Science isperhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
P 137, l. 29. [Greek:----] is here used in its most extensive sense,[Greek:----] would be its chief Instrument.
P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:----].
P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdomis employed there will be general principles, and the application ofthem, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to theoperations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of CivilGovernment, is called Legislation, as administering its particularfunctions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, thereare of course general Rules, and also the particular application ofthem; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too whenSelf-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:----], "our mere Operatives in Public business."(Chalmers.)
P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self,(which is [Greek:----] proper) or not-Self, i.e. either one'sfamily=[Greek:----], or one's community=[Greek:----], but here thesupreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:----],the latter [Greek:----] proper, whose functions are deliberation andthe administration of justice.
P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community?see Horace's account of the way in which his father made him reapinstruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv.105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler'sfirst three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidencein fact of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence i.e. love ofothers. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise,chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
P. 140, l. 17. More truly "implied," namely, that Practical Wisdomresults from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply becausesuggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter inhand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei].(Book 1. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they arelast arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on wehave the term applied to first principles, because they stand at oneextremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which givesthis sense, "Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind ofsense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind." In a passage soutterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worthwhile to take much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1.xxiv.), "a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to considerof it."
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causationthe rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. Allthat receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to thesun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on theside next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly andcorrectly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright onthe side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mentalact.
P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others;and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Endsbut there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to theGreat End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grandEnd, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects asbeing right means to the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative[Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek:eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this constructionwould restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros titelos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning ofthis word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it whichconnects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae,and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodnessinformed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is notactually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, soproper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?he is then [Greek: euboulos]--is he passing under review the suggestionsof others? he is [Greek: sunetos]--is he judging of the acts of others?he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness--is heapplying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]--while in each and all he is[Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or rejectwithout proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior toall reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which aresimply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both thesecases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this namethe Faculty which attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter offact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogismis wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss(i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestionsof [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he isfirmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratificationof his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokeinaytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progresstowards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case ofprevious good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of theright one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The consequentia is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit ofreasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. Whatmakes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience,and therefore, etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek:euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] inthe Topics, I. xiii. 10,
[ [Greek: to men hygieias poi鎡ikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] [ [Greek: to de phylaktikon], [ [Greek: to de s鎚antikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health. Medicine is the efficient.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud h?hygieia kai ho iatroshomoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phron鎠is] is here used in a partial senseto signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element ofPractical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown inobiter, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], becausethe abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. "Up toanything" is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but toonearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Arch鎉 on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
"This particular action is------."
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein--tigar dei prattein h?m? to telos aut鎠 estin] i.e. [Greek: t鎠phron鎠eos].--(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. "Look asquint on the face of truth." Sir T. Browne,Religio Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood asgoverning the signification of the other two terms, there being nosingle Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towardsthese Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X.[Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek t鎠 aret鎠].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phron鎠is] is usedthroughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete senseof Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the IntellectualElement of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hithertogiven represents rather what men may be than what they are. In thisbook we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary,every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This illustrates the expression, "Deceits of theFlesh."
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:----]; the meaning ofthe whole passage would be exactly the same--it would then run, "if hehad been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he werenow acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change ofconviction."
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:----][Greek----]
P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular,others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott's "RedGauntlet."
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or theminor premise, it is true, that "all that is sweet is pleasant," it istrue also, that "this is sweet," what is contrary to Right Reason is thebringing in this minor to the major i.e. the universal maxim,forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with themaxim in his mind "All excess is to be avoided," at a certain time his[Greek:----] tells him "This glass is excess." As a matter of merereasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion "This glass is to beavoided," and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordinglyabstain. But [Greek:----], being a simple tendency towards indulgencesuggests, in place of the minor premise "This is excess," its ownpremise "This is sweet," this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim orprinciple ('[Greek:----]), "All that is sweet is to be tasted," and so,by strict logical sequence, proves "This glass is to be tasted."
The solution then of the ph鎛omenon of [Greek:----] is this that[Greek:----], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps thesuggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:----] i.e. [Greek:----]easily defeats [Greek:----]. The [Greek:----], an hour before he is intemptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim "All that is sweetis to be tasted" to "All excess is to be avoided." The [Greek:----]would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Qu?virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes Verum hic impransi mecum disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. "Look not thou upon the wine when it isred," etc. P. 160, l. 2. [Greek: oron]. Aristotle's own account of thisword (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis],but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that theproposition itself is really indicated by it.
P. 161, l. 16. The Greek would give "avoids excessive pain," but this isnot true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrantfor translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below[Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy,Part I chap v sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4 Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on[Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler's Sermon onResentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from theconcisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,
[Footnote: [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance fromwhich this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in theChapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
Actions of Lust are more unjust
P. 168, l. 3. [Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference ofopinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendationwhich substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes alldifficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton maeproairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
The [Greek: akolastos] deliberately pursues pleasure and declines painif there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under[Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps notquite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong actscaused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and thenof course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may befitly given respectively.
P. 169, l. 29. "If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying,we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physicianwho knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is amortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the firstsymptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish" Sewell, Sermons toYoung Men (Sermon xii.)
P. 170, 1. 6. Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makeshis Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, thepowerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will doesnot act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason.His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, andnote on page 128.
P. 171, 1. 17. Let a man be punctual on principle to any oneengagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all hisothers in their due places relatively to this one; and so will oftenwear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
P. 172, 1. 21. Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action,which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop Butler's first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion ofnote on p. 129.
P. 179, 1. 4. Abandoning Bekker's punctuation and reading [Greek: maeagathon], yields a better sense.
"Why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good? He can liveeven with Pain because," etc.
P. 179, 1. 25. [Greek: pheugei] may be taken perhaps as equivalentto [Greek: pheugouoi] and so balance [Greek: chairouoi]. But compareChapter VIII (Bekker).
P. 183, 1. 6. "Owe no man anything, but to love one another for hethat loveth another hath fulfilled the Law." Romans XIII. 8.
P. 183, I. 20. [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line fromHesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
P. 184, I. 33. In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin thatshe
"two stone bottles found, To hold the liquor that she loved, And keep it safe and sound."
P. 187, 1. 24. Cardwell's reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai taloipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker's.
P. 192, 1. 34. The Great man will have a right to look for moreFriendship than he bestows, but the Good man can feel Friendship onlyfor, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
P. 195, 1. 12. See note on page 68, 1. 8.
P. 202, 1. 28. See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek:tauton].
P. 203, 1. 35. "For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the oneought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity." P. 206,1. 10. Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognisethe obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
P. 217, 1. 10. "Neither the Son of man, that He should repent."Numbers xxiii. 19.
"In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employmentof a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use."Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
P. 218, 1. 17. "I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case isthat Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance tomany guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shallcommand him to come to the window, and the other to the table, andanother to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to comeupstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant,how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sadcondition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave untosin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness tothe bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs,and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary tothemselves as to Virtue." (Fuller's Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix'tContemplations, viii.)
P. 235, 1. 14. See note, p. 43.
P. 235, 1. 24. See Book II. chap. ix.
P. 237, 1. 3. See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
P. 238, 1. 2. The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: thatthere is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon],and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of itsparticipation in that.
P. 238, 1. 9. See note on page 136, 1. 15.
P. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds: [sidenote:Categories, chap xi.]
From not being to being . . . . Generation
From being to not being . . . . Destruction From being to being more . . . . Increase From being to being less . . . . Diminution From being here to being there . . Change of Place From being in this way to being in that Alteration
P. 238, 1 31. A may go to sleep quicker than B, but cannot do moresleep in a given time.
P. 239, 1. 3. Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi tonsomaton, k. t. l.]
P. 241, 1. 6. Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
P. 241, 1. 9. That is, subordinate Movements are complete beforethe whole Movement is. P. 242, 1. 7. Pleasure is so instantaneous asensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; thelongest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, sorapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.
P. 245, 1. 18. A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk bythe [Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek:oikeia lupae] of gout in the feet.
P. 249, 1. 12. I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon tohamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent thedepth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connectan earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
P. 250, 1. 12. Bishop Butler, contra (Sermon XV.).
"Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attendto the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it,which is the entertainment of the mind." The two statements may howeverbe reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that thepursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from theminor hindrances which attend on learning.
Footnote P. 250, 1. 30. The clause immediately following indicates thatAristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happinesshaving been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], butthe statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6,1. 15.
P. 251, 1. 7. That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happyaggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is saidof Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
P. 252, 1. 22. See note, page 146, 1. 17.